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THREE ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 
(Order No.3 0'-''-1 !05Jo 
TOSHIAKI SHINOZAKI 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2012 
Major Professor: Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Professor of Economics 
ABSTRACT 
My dissertation consists of three papers on international finance, international 
economics, and labor economics. The first paper develops a stochastic general 
equilibrium model to understand the effects of default risk on output, consumption, 
investment, and current account deficits in emerging markets. The second paper studies 
how market structure affects exchange-rate pass-through. This analysis is empirical as 
well as theoretical, using a partial equilibrium model. The third paper develops a model to 
study relative wages across different educational levels in developed countries. 
The model in my first paper features endogenous default risk. Its calibration results 
explain a number of important stylized facts about emerging economies, including the 
negative correlation between investment and net exports, the procyclicality of investment, 
and the potential for current account reversals. 
The second paper compares exchange-rate pass-through under perfect competition 
and oligopoly, showing that the two different market structures have opposite effects on 
this currency pricing behavior. The paper's empirical test, whether implemented on the 
basis of a partial equilibrium framework or on the model's general equilibrium framework, 
finds support for perfect competition. 
The third paper uses differences within and across industries in education wage 
v 
premiums to study factors affecting those premiums. The paper begins by showing that 
within-industry as opposed to cross-industry educational wage premiums explain most of 
developed country differences in wages by education. It then develops a theoretical model 
and an empirical testing strategy, using U.S. and Japanese data, to examine whether the 
use of IT capital and the decision to outsource affect the education-wage premium. The 
answer is mixed depending on the country in question. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 
Stylized facts of emerging economies include high volatility in investment and 
consumption as well as sudden stops accompanied by current account reversals. In 
Chapter 2, we develop a stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous default risk 
and capital accumulation. The model studies the procyclicality of investment, 
countercyclicality of the current account and net exports, and current account reversals, in 
addition to high volatility in consumption relative to that in output and countercyclical 
interest rate spikes. We extend the model developed by Arellano (2008) that relates 
endogenous default risk and fluctuations in income. However, in the paper, income 
fluctuations come from changes in productivity since we introduce capital accumulation. 
Our model matches features of the business cycle of Argentina and stylized facts of 
developing countries: procyclicality of consumption and investment, countercyclicality of 
net exports and high volatility in the consumption relative to output. In addition, the 
model solved three unsolved stylized facts: negative correlation between investment and 
net exports, procyclicality of investment, and current account reversals. 
In a basic RBC model, interest rates are procyclical for large country cases since 
interest rates reflect marginal productivity of capital. For emerging economies, the 
procyclicality of interest rates is counterfactual. This is because emerging economies 
sometimes need to pay a risk premium when issuing sovereign debt. This paper studies a 
small open economy (SOE) model with endogenous default probability in which 
productivity shocks follow a Markov process. The government borrows from international 
financial intermediaries through non·contingent bonds and can choose to default on its 
debt, or not to, based on the value function for each case. The equilibrium interest rate is 
set to reflect the default probability. It is clear that default probability is high (low) if a 
series of negative (positive) productivity shocks occur. The level of physical capital and the 
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amount of bonds held in the next period are determined simultaneously through the 
maximization of the value function with a budget constraint. The equilibrium interest rate 
tends to be high (low) if a series of negative (positive) productivity shocks occur. 
The main feature of our model is the introduction of capital accumulation. As is seen in 
many economies, investment is most volatile among variables and investment plays 
important part in RBC literature. By adding capital accumulation, three unsolved stylized 
facts observed in data for default countries are solved: negative correlation between 
investment and net exports, procyclicality of investment, and current account reversals. 
When there is a large productivity shock, consumption decreases because of an income 
effect and substitution effect in the presence of an interest rate spike. In the model, 
investment also decreases because of a productivity shock. Investment decreased at the 
time of Argentina's sovereign default. Since consumption and investment drop more than 
output, net exports turn positive. This finally caused current account reversals. 
In Chapter 3, we study exchange rate pass-through. Exchange rates directly affect the 
profits of firms, especially exporting firms. In many countries, exporting firms need to 
present their prices in foreign currency, while they have to pay for their costs in domestic 
currency. Thus, exchange rate pass-through becomes an important factor. In case of high 
exchange pass-through, for example, 1, exporting firms can incorporate all effects of 
currency fluctuations in their exporting price, but in case of low exchange rate 
pass-through, for example, 0, the exporting firms must absorb all currency fluctuations. 1 
We construct a partial equilibrium model with four types of firms: a home country firm, 
foreign firm 1, foreign firm 2, and a local subsidy of foreign firm 1. Since the exchange rate 
for foreign country 2 is pegged to the currency of the home country, only foreign country 
firm 1 faces exchange rate fluctuations. We study two cases-perfect completion and 
oligopoly-and analyze the effect of (1) the share of foreign country 1, (2) share of the local 
subsidy of the firm in that country, (3) the share of foreign firm 2, and (4) exchange rate 
1 Note that our exchange rate pass-through is based on contractual prices, not on the 
domestic currency. 
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appreciation. Under perfect competition, exchange rate pass-through declines in all cases 
mainly because of lost market power. However, under oligopoly, exchange rate 
pass-through generally rises in all cases. 
We also conduct empirical tests on the result of the analytical model, using data for 
Japan. Basically, our estimation results are consistent with the perfect competition case. 
Japan's trade share has a positive impact on exchange rate pass-through while the share of 
overseas subsidiaries of Japanese firms has a negative effect. As Bergin and Feenstra 
(2007) show, China's share decreases exchange pass-through for Japan because China's 
currency is pegged to the U.S. dollar. An increase in China's trade share plays the same 
role as a rise in the share of U.S. domestic fums. Estimation results show that yen 
appreciation also has a negative impact on exchange rate pass-through as predicted in the 
perfect competition case. However, its effect is subtle. 
Finally, a three-country static general equilibrium model is constructed based on the 
study by Bergin and Feenstra (2002). We add local subsidiaries competing with exporting 
countries in the model and incorporate the effect of domestic firms. Intuitively, local 
subsidiaries and a fixed exchange rate country have the same effect, and the former 
moderates exchange rate pass-through through intensified competition. Calibration 
results also suggest that exchange rate pass-through is lowered not only by foreign 
countries, but also by local subsidiaries. 
In Chapter 4, we study relative wage. In developed countries, the premium for higher 
education is not continually rising. Relative wage in the U.S. and Germany increased while 
relative employment of skilled to unskilled labor also rose. This can be explained by a 
greater increase in the demand for skilled labor than in the supply of skilled labor. On the 
contrary, Japan, the UK and France faced a decline in the relative wage when relative 
employment rose. 
In all countries, the wage share of skilled labor is increasing. For countries with an 
increasing relative wage, the demand for skilled labor exceeds the supply as Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999) explains. This can be interpreted that even though the demand for skilled 
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labor increases, the relative wage declines if the supply of skilled labor exceeds the 
demand. 
We decomposed labor supply and demand into a between-industry effect and 
within-industry effect. We found that within-industry effect is far larger than 
between-industry effect for rise of the wage share of skilled labor. 
Let us discuss changes in the manufacturing sector, following Feenstra and Hanson 
(2001). The rise in the wage share of skilled labor in the U.S. is the highest among the six 
countries. The skilled labor employment of Japan and France increased faster than that of 
the U.S. while the wage share of skilled labor in those countries increased less than that in 
the U.S. Since we have more detailed data, we focus on Japan as a country whose relative 
wage behaves oppositely to that of the U.S. To explain the within-industry effect, by 
following Feenstra and Hanson (2001), we construct a model in which an increase in 
intermediate input is neutral to the demand for skilled labor. Skilled labor can increase or 
decrease as a result of an increase in intermediate input purchases from abroad. In an 
addition, we introduce the decision on the assembly location into the model and assume 
that the workers in the assembly process are unskilled. Therefore, if firms want to keep 
their assembly factories inside the country, then the demand for unskilled labor does not 
decrease even with an increase in intermediate input purchases from abroad. The model of 
Feenstra and Hanson (2001) implies that an increase in the outsourcing of intermediate 
input increases the incentive to relocate assembly factories outside the country. This is 
because they assume that the assembly process uses neither human capital nor physical 
capital. Our model assumes that the assembly process uses human capital and is intensive 
in unskilled labor. Then, an increase in the outsourcing of intermediate input raises the 
relative demand for skilled labor by diminishing intermediate input, which is intensive in 
unskilled labor, and also reduces the relative demand for skilled labor by raising the level 
of assembly activities. Thus, an increase in intermediate input does not necessarily 
promote skill upgrading. That is, by outsourcing intermediate input, some countries would 
concentrate on assembling intermediate components using mainly unskilled labor. 
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The estimation results show the effect of structural variables on the share of skilled 
labor within an industry. Estimation results suggest that the estimated coefficient for IT 
capital is significant and positive for the U.S. and Japan, while that for total outsourcing is 
not significant for both countries. We decompose intermediate input into energy input, 
material input, and service input. The estimated coefficient for material input is 
significant and positive for the U.S., while that for the other two intermediate inputs is not 
significant. As for Japan, the estimated coefficient for service input and energy input is 
negative and significant; however, that for material input is not significant. This result 
implies that the U.S. can increase the share of high-skilled labor by outsourcing low-skilled 
intermediate input, but the share of high-skilled labor in Japan can be reduced by 
outsourcing. The estimated coefficient for the ratio of workers in the assembly process is 
negative and significant, and that for intermediate purchases from abroad is also negative 
and significant. This implies that in Japan the manufacturing sector's demand for skilled 
labor is, contrary to the case of the U.S., decreased due to an increase in intermediate 
input purchases from abroad by strong intensity of assembly process location. This 
intensity explains the slow pace in the growth of the wage share of skilled labor. 
6 
Chapter 2 
A quantitative analysis on sovereign default 
Argentina is well known for its current account reversal and sudden drop in output 
observed during its financial crisis. The country's current account is decomposed into the 
trade balance and other components in Figure 1. While the ratio of other components to 
GDP is stable, the trade balance mainly makes the current account positive. Trade balance 
is defined as output minus consumption and investment if there is no government 
consumption. Figure 2 shows that consumption dropped more sharply from the first 
quarter of 2001 than output. This consumption drop partly accounts for the positive trade 
balance. The drop in consumption can be attributed to an income effect which results from 
negative productivity shock and substitution effect which results from a countercyclical 
interest rate spike caused by a rise in default risk. As to other economic factors, Figure 2 
shows that investment dropped more sharply than consumption and output. The fall in 
investment also accounts for the positive trade balance together with the decline in 
consumption. Negative productivity shocks trigger a drop in investment because marginal 
productivity of capital falls. If a negative productivity shock worsens, the interest rate 
increases because of a rise in default risk. With a rise in the cost of issuing sovereign debt, 
an interest rate spike accelerates the fall in investment. Through these paths, a large TFP 
shortfall makes the trade balance positive. Table 1 describes Argentina's actual business 
cycle statistics. Consumption and investment are procyclical, and the current account or 
net exports is countercyclical. It implies a negative correlation between investment and the 
current account or net exports. In addition, investment is most volatile than other 
variables. Then it is necessary to include investment in the model to study unsolved 
puzzles. 
In this chapter, we develop a stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous 
default risk and capital accumulation. The model studies the procyclicality of investment, 
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countercyclicality of the current account and net exports, and current account reversals, in 
addition to high volatility in consumption relative to that in output and countercyclical 
interest rate spikes. We extend the model developed by Arellano (2008) that relates 
endogenous default risk and fluctuations in income. However, income fluctuations come 
from changes in productivity since we introduce capital accumulation. The model can 
generate procyclicality of investment, and countercyclicality of the net exports and current 
account reversals. 
In a basic RBC model, interest rates are procyclical for large country cases since 
interest rates reflect marginal productivity of capital. For emerging economies, the 
procyclicality of interest rates is counterfactual. This is because emerging economies 
sometimes need to pay a risk premium when issuing sovereign debt. This chapter studies a 
small open economy (SOE) model with endogenous default probability in which 
productivity shocks follow a Markov process. The government borrows from international 
financial intermediaries through non-contingent bonds and can choose to default on its 
debt, or not to, based on the value function for each case. The equilibrium interest rate is 
set to reflect the default probability. It is clear that default probability is high Oow) if a 
series of negative (positive) productivity shocks occur. The level of physical capital and the 
amount of bonds held in the next period are determined simultaneously through the 
maximization of the value function with a budget constraint. The equilibrium interest rate 
tends to be high Oow) if a series of negative (positive) productivity shocks occur. 
The main feature of our model is the introduction of capital accumulation. As we can 
see in Table 1, investment is most volatile among variables and investment plays 
important part in RBC literature. By adding capital accumulation, three unsolved stylized 
facts observed in data for default countries are solved: negative correlation between 
investment and net exports, procyclicality of investment, and current account reversals. 
When there is a large productivity shock, consumption decreases because of an income 
effect and substitution effect in the presence of an interest rate spike. In the model, 
investment also decreases because of a productivity shock. Figure 2 shows that investment 
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decreased at the time of Argentina's sovereign default. Since consumption and investment 
drop more than output, net exports turn positive. This finally caused current account 
reversals. 
On the subject of business cycles, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) showed that the 
standard deviation of private consumption relative to that of GDP is higher in emerging 
economies than in developed economies; however, the standard deviation of investment 
relative to that of GDP is almost the same for both emerging and developed economies. 
Arellano (2008) developed a stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous 
default risk. In the model, which is small open and endowment economy, interest rates are 
dependent on endogenous default risk. The simulation results match the various business 
cycle statistics in Argentina. In addition, the model can also replicate Argentina's default. 
However, the model cannot replicate current account reversals. This is because Arellano's 
model assumes an endowment economy with no investment. In an endowment economy, an 
SOE wants higher borrowing due to an income effect, but, at the same time, wants lower 
borrowing due to an interest rate spike. In Arellano's model, the latter effect dominates the 
former effect. Intuitively, consumption is indeed more volatile than output in emerging 
economies, but investment is far more volatile than output and consumption as we can see 
in Table 1. By introducing a production function and capital accumulation, an SOE reduces 
investment when it experiences a negative productivity shock and interest spike. Along 
with a massive collapse in consumption, this turns net export to be positive then it caused 
current account reversals. 
Mendoza (2006) introduces capital accumulation and productivity shocks that follow a 
Markov process. He constructs an equilibrium business cycle model and succeeds in 
replicating key features of the Sudden Stop phenomenon observed in Mexico after 
December 1994. In the model, in addition to TFP, price and the world interest rate are 
assumed to follow a Markov process. 
Mendoza and Yue (2008) proposed a model which connects business cycle models and 
sovereign default model. In their paper, physical capital is assumed to be fixed and the role 
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of investment is absent. The model replicates observed V-shaped output dynamics around 
default episodes, countercyclical sovereign spreads, and high debt ratios. Their model 
matches the variability of consumption and the countercyclical fluctuations of net exports. 
2.1 The Model Economy 
We construct a model by following Adda and Cooper (2003). The model is a variant of 
the stochastic general equilibrium model studied by Arellano (2008) and incorporates 
capital formation. 
The model has two sectors-a sovereign country and international financial 
intermediaries. The sovereign country is assumed to decide on all resource allocation and 
debt default on behalf of its households. Also, the sole firm in the economy is owned by the 
sovereign country. That is, production, consumption, and capital formation are centralized. 
The household preferences over consumption are given by 
(2.1) 
where the discount factor is denoted by P e (0,1). The utility function u is assumed to be 
continuous and strictly concave. Note that labor supply is assumed to be fixed for 
simplicity. 
The production function exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to two 
inputs-labor and physical capital. We assume that the single firm is competitive and is 
owned by the government. The firm hires labor ( L1 ) and uses capital ( K 1 ) in its production 
process. However, for simplicity, we assume our labor supply is fixed at L . Let A be a 
compact set. A e A represents productivity shocks. We assume that A e A is a random 
variable that follows a Markov process. 7r is the density function which shows the 
probability of state A, and L0 n(A) = l.The production function is as follows. 
(2.2) 
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As mentioned above, the production function is assumed to be increasing in physical 
capital and labor and strictly concave and to exhibit constant returns to scale. 
As for the resource constraint, the sovereign country chooses the level of consumption 
and physical capital and the amount of bonds. The interest rate depends on the current 
productivity shock, physical capital, and bonds. We assume first that the country has no 
option to default on its debt. Then, the following expression is the budget constraint. Note 
that we will discuss the bond price in the following section. 
(2.3) 
In this model, we allow the sovereign country to choose to default on its bonds. In such 
a case, the contract associated with the bonds is abandoned. Thus, the country has no bond 
in its budget constraint in case of a default. 
(2.4) 
From this point forward, variables x, and xt+1 are denoted as x and x', respectively. 
Capital accumulation is expressed as 
K'~ ¢(1/K)K +(1-8)K. (2.5) 
Capital accumulates with an adjustment cost rjJ and depreciation rate 8 . The 
adjustment cost rjJ affects the quantity of output that must be foregone to increase a unit 
of capital stock in a particular location, as discussed by Hayashi (1982). Baxter and 
Crucini (1996) points out that capital accumulation costs mitigate the response of 
investment to location·specific shocks. 
We assume that II is a cumulative density function. Due to its properties, we assume 
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that II increases monotonically, and that 7r = II' is a bounded real function on A and 
is integrable over A . Suppose that the sovereign country does not have an option to default. 
Then, the expected value function, which depends on the density function 7r and set A, 
can be written as 
v(A,B,K) = maxl{u(C)}-A- + pr v(K',B',A')n(A'IA)dA'j, 
C,K',B' Jn· 
s.t qB'+C +I~ J(K, A, I)+ B, (2.6) 
K'~ ¢(1/ K)K + (1- o)K. 
Now, suppose that the sovereign country has an option to default. We will define 
default sets and non·default sets. Let 0 be a set. Suppose that for each element A of 
A, there is an associated subset of 0 which is denoted by EA. 
Set S is defined as the union of the sets E A such that x E S if and only if x E E A 
for at least one A E A . Then, we have S = AYA E A . 
Let sets G(A) and D(A) be the sets of productivity shocks with which the sovereign 
country chooses not to default and to default, respectively. The sets are disjoint and 
S = G(A)UD(A). 
The default decision depends on the value function that the sovereign country will face 
at the end of a period. Let v 0 be the value function which the sovereign country keeps in 
international financial market and vD be the value function which the sovereign chooses 
default and leaves international financial market. If v 0 is larger than vD, then the 
sovereign country repays its debt. If v 0 is smaller than vD, then it declares default. Let 
the optimal value function that is chosen by the sovereign country be v0 . The optimal 
value function will be chosen as 
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v0 = max {vG, vD}. 
B',K',Default 
(2.7) 
Before we discuss the setup that allows for a default mechanism, we consider the 
interest rate that the sovereign country will face. In the standard real business cycle model, 
the interest rate reflects marginal productivity of capital. In our model, the sovereign 
country has an option to default on its debt. International financial intermediaries need to 
incorporate such risks into the interest rate as a risk premium. We assume that the 
sovereign country is too small to influence the international financial market. 
International fmancial intermediaries are assumed to deal with safe assets and their 
interest rate is assumed to be constant at r . As we discussed earlier, the default decision 
depends on the state of a productivity shock, the amount of bonds, and the level of physical 
capital. Let the probability of default be 11(B' ,K' ,A) . The international financial 
intermediaries in the model are assumed to be risk neutral and behave competitively. They 
purchase the amount of bonds desired by the country as long as the price satisfies 
q(B',K',A)= (1-MB',K',A))_ (2.8) 
l+r 
Here, a rise in default probability makes 11(B', K', A) a positive value and decreases 
the bond price. This increases the cost of investment and consumption smoothing. After a 
productivity shock felt through the decrease in the bond price as well as a fall in marginal 
productivity of capital, the sovereign country needs to change the level of investment and 
consumption by introducing a default mechanism. 
Since the default decision is based on the value function, the amount of bonds currently 
held and the current level of physical capital also affect the default decision. In general, 
the more the sovereign country is indebted, the greater its incentive is to default. 
In the international financial market, the interest rate is determined at the beginning 
of a period. The sovereign country starts with physical capital K and assets B . The 
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sovereign country observes a productivity shock A and decides whether it will repay its 
debt or default on it. If the government decides to repay, then taking as given the schedule 
of the assets' rental price q , the government chooses I and B' subject to the resource 
constraint. Then, production and consumption take place. 
Finally, we discuss the maximization problem. In the case of non-default, given the 
interest rate that is determined in the aforementioned algorithm, the sovereign country 
chooses the amount of bonds held and the level of physical capital for the next period to 
maximize its value function. Its maximization problem is as follows. 
va(A,B,K) = maxl{u(C)}+ pJ v0 (K',B',A')n'(A'iA)dA'j 
C,K',B' A' (2.9) 
s.t q(B' ,K' ,A)B'+C +I 5. Y + B, 
K'5.t/J(I/K)K +(1-J)K, 
Y=AF(K,I). 
Since the sovereign country chooses to stay in the international financial market, 
consumption can be smoothed, and investment can be financed through sovereign debt. 
However, in the following period, the sovereign country can decide to default or not to 
default. Thus, the value function is v0 . 
If the sovereign country declares default, then it is no longer required to repay its debt, 
but can no longer borrow. In other words, the amount of bonds held by the sovereign 
country is set to zero. Hence, the budget constraint will be changed as follows. 
C+I5.Y. (2.10) 
When the sovereign country declares a default it needs to experience a psychic cost A, , 
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which is assumed to be a fixed value. This psychic cost is an additional cost which the 
sovereign country experience when it defaults but does not appear in an interest rate spike. 
Chatterjee et al. (2007) introduce pecuniary costs which reduce income by some fraction. 
As an example, they discuss annual fees on secured credit cards. In reality, the sovereign 
country needs to accept periodical examinations by international organizations such as the 
IMF which potentially entails a certain degree of limitation on the country's policy-making 
abilities. The introduction of an implicit cost takes into account such costs. 
However, a defaulting country can be allowed to reenter the international financial 
market after some periods. Following Arellano (2008), we assume that a defaulting country 
can reenter the international financial market in the following period with probability p. 
The maximization problem then becomes 
vD(A,B,K) = ~~~l{u(C)}-A+ PL {pv 0 (K',O,A') + (1- p)vD(K',O,A')Pr(A'iA)dA'J 
s.t C+l~Y, (2.11) 
K'~¢(1/K)K +(1-8)K, 
Y=AF(K,I). 
Since the sovereign country chooses to default, consumption and investment are 
constrained by current output. In the next period, the sovereign country can decide to 
default or not to default if it is allowed (with probability p) to return to the international 
financial market. When the reentrance is allowed, the sovereign country is assumed to 
start with no bonds being held because of the forgiven debt. Since the sovereign country 
can decide to default or not to default, its value function is v0 • With probability (1-p), the 
sovereign country stays to be an autarky. In such a case, the amount of bonds held is zero, 
and the country's value function is still vD . 
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Note that our dynamic problem does not have unique solution and contraction mapping 
theorem does not apply. This is because we assume two agents, that is SOE and 
international financial intermediaries. Then our future value function is not observable 
that Blackwell's sufficient condition for fixed point theorem requires as is shown in Alvarez 
and Jermann (2000). 
2.2 Quantitative Analysis 
2.2.1 Model setting 
In our model, there is an SOE and the rest of the world. The parameters for its 
preferences and productivity are the same as those in the model by Baxter and Crucini 
(1993). The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at a = 2. Labor's share is a = 0.58. 
As noted by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), this is the average postwar value of labor's 
share in GNP, excluding proprietors' income. The discount factor f3 is set at 0.98. The 
average quarterly gross growth rate of the economy is y = 1.004 , and the quarterly 
depreciation rate is t5 = 0.025. We assume that a= 2. For simplicity, we set linear cost 
function f/J(I/K)K =10*(1/K). Cost function is set to prevent extreme and highly 
unrealistic capital accumulation or capital flight as in Baxter and Crucini (1993). 
The utility function in our numerical simulations is as follows. 
1-u 
c 
u(c) =--. 
1-a 
(2.12) 
The stochastic process for TFP is discretized by using a quadrature method based on 
Hussey and Tauchen (1991) and TFP of Argentina. It is assumed to be a log·normal AR(1) 
process with drift 
' 
that is, log( A,) = J.l + p Iog(A,_1) + s: with and 
El(eA Y J= 173 . The estimated coefficients are J.l = 0.58 and p = 0.60. The shock is 
discretized into a 31-state Markov chain using the quadrature based procedure. 
Note that agents have no information on future productivity shocks. Productivity 
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shocks follow a Markov process. Agents can only expect the next period's productivity 
shock. At the beginning of a period, agents know the level of the productivity shock for the 
current period. They decide the level of capital accumulation and the amount of bond to be 
held. At the end of the period, the decision on defaulting is made. Then, the next period 
arrives. Indeed, the probability of a negative productivity shock rises after a continuum of 
negative productivity shocks. However, the probability of a positive productivity shock is 
non-zero even when agents have experienced a sequence of negative productivity shocks. 
2.2.3 Simulation results 
In this section, the model is solved numerically sing a set of benchmark parameters. 
High and Low productivity shocks have five states above and below the mean state, 
respectively. Note that the following figures are generated by the algorithm described in 
this Appendix B. Figure 3, 4 and 5 show the bond price schedule faced by the SOE in the 
model, q( B', K', A) . High productivity shock and low productivity shock in the figures are 
two sigma above and below mean productivity. 
Figure 3 depicts the bond price schedule depending on productivity shock. As is shown 
in case of high bondholding, bond price rises as the productivity shock gets higher. Figure 1 
also shows that SOE in less indebted faces higher bond price than that in more indebted. It 
implies that the SOE can borrow with less capital cost when it is high productivity. Then it 
induces investment together with higher marginal productivity of capital. Thus positive 
correlation between consumption and investment is expected. 
Figure 4 and 5 show the bond price schedule depending on next period's physical 
capital and bondholding, with fixed current bondholding and current physical capital 
respectively. Bond price is an increasing function of next period's physical capital and 
bondholding. The SOE faces higher bond price in high productivity shock than in low 
productivity shock both in physical capital and bondholding. It implies that the higher 
productivity shock the SOE experiences, the less likely it chooses to default. Then interest 
rate is expected to be countercyclical in our model, which matches the actual data in 
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Argentina. Through this cost, interest rate is expected to have negative correlation with 
investment, consumption. 
Low capital procurement costs, caused by high productivity shocks, make the SOE 
borrow more to increase consumption and investment when its economy is booming. On 
the other hand, the SOE tends to squeeze consumption and investment when capital 
procurement costs increase along with low productivity shock. In an extreme case, after 
continued low productivity shocks, the SOE is highly likely to stay with low productivity 
shocks due to the nature of a Markov process. Then, international financial intermediaries 
charge higher interest rates. At the same time, marginal physical capital also stays at low 
levels. Thus, the SOE decreases its investment sharply and borrows less, which might 
cause current account reversals. 
Figure 6 shows the policy function of physical capital with fixed current bondholding as 
a function of productivity shock given bond price, K'(K,B,A;q). Next period's physical 
capital is increasing with current physical capital and the SOE accumulate more capital in 
high productivity shock than in low productivity shock. This is caused by an increase of 
marginal productivity and low capital procurement cost when it is in boom as we discussed 
above. 
Figure 7 shows the savings policy function with fixed physical capital as a function of 
productivity shock for high and low given bond price, B'(K,B,A;q). With the same 
productivity shock, next period's bondholding is increasing with current bondholding. The 
SOE borrows more in high productivity shock than in low productivity shock as in Figure 7. 
Note that the SOE with positive bondholding borrows more in high productivity shock 
than in low productivity shock in Figure 7. This is because the SOE with positive 
bondholding, which has no incentive to default, accumulates physical capital. 
Figure 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 show the value function depending on (A,K,K' ,B,B') 
respectively. As we see in the policy function of physical capital and bondholding, value 
functions are also increasing in (A,K,K' ,B,B') and Figure 8 shows that value function of 
high productivity shock is larger than that of low productivity shock. From Figure 9 to 
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Figure 12, vD intersects v0 . The SOE chooses to default when the value function of 
financial autarky, which is vD, is larger than that of keeping in the international financial 
market, which is v0 • Then in the part in which the value function of default is larger than 
that ofnon·default, the SOE chooses to default. Figure 8 shows threshold of A and that the 
SOE with lower productivity shock is likely to choose default. Figure 9 shows threshold of 
Band that the SOE with more debts is likely to choose default. As Arellano (2008) shows, 
the SOE with lower productivity shock and with more debts, faces more risks to default. 
Next, let us analyze the business cycle in the model compared with the data for 
Argentina. Table 1 shows actual data. Consumption is more volatile than output, but 
investment is most volatile among five variables. Output is positively correlated with 
consumption and investment but negatively correlated with net exports and interest rate 
spread. Consumption and investment shows high procyclicality then positively correlated 
with output. Output, consumption and investment are negatively correlated with interest 
rate spreads, while only net exports are positively related with interest rate spread. Net 
exports is negatively correlated with output, consumption and investment while interest 
rate spread is positively correlated with net exports. 
Table 2 and Table 3 show the calibration result of Arellano (2008) and current model 
respectively. We simulate the model in the same way as Arellano (2008). Simulation is 
carried out overtime and 100 default episodes are chosen. Then the data is extracted from 
observations before default. We report the mean statistics of the data in Table 3. The 
current model matches features of the business cycle of Argentina and stylized facts of 
developing countries: procyclicality of consumption and investment, countercyclicality of 
net exports and high volatility in the consumption relative to output. In addition, the 
model solved two unsolved stylized facts: negative correlation between investment and net 
exports, procyclicality of investment. But the Table 3 shows that procyclicality of 
investment is not so high as Argentina's actual data and interest rate is less volatile than 
Argentina's actual data. This is because investment is quite sensitive to marginal 
productivity in our calibration model and pecuniary cost for default may be set too high. 
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We conduct simulations for the first quarter of 1993 onward. When our calibration 
proceeded, TFP is set to follow the value that Argentina experienced in the same period. 
Figure 13 shows its result for the last four years. Generally, consumption rises and falls 
along with output and its fluctuation looks higher than that of output. It implies that 
correlation between consumption and output is positive and consumption is more volatile 
than output. 
The net exports·GDP ratio goes upward (downward) when output decreases (increases). 
It leads to countercyclicality of net export in the simulation result in Table 3. This matches 
the results in the actual data in Table 1. Then we could replicate positive net exports 
induced by negative productivity shocks, which lead to current account reversals in the 
last two quarter of 2001 along with an interest rate spike, which is the last remaining 
puzzle. 
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Chapter 3 
Factors affecting exchange rate pass-through 
In Chapter 3, we study exchange rate pass-through. Exchange rates directly affect the 
profits of firms, especially exporting firms. In many countries, exporting firms need to 
present their prices in foreign currency, while they have to pay for their costs in domestic 
currency. Thus, exchange rate pass-through becomes an important factor. In case of high 
exchange pass-through, for example, 1, exporting firms can incorporate all effects of 
currency fluctuations in their exporting price, but in case of low exchange rate 
pass-through, for example, 0, the exporting firms must absorb all currency fluctuations.2 
Fluctuations in exchange rate pass-through for Japan are estimated with almost the 
same method used by Marazzi et al. (2005). We made a rolling regression with a five-year 
window to see longer effect on exchange rate pass-through. Figure 14 and Figure 15 show 
the result of rolling regressions with a five-year window. In the 1980s, exchange rate 
pass-through decreases as production cost, which is consisted of Corporate Goods Price 
Index multiplied by nominal effective exchange rate, begin to rise, but it recovers with 
substantial lags. Exchange rate pass-through is thirty percent on average during the 
period. In the 1990s, exchange rate pass-through is low compared with the 1980s. Its level 
declines by an average of ten percent. The basic results are consistent with those obtained 
by Marazzi et al. (2005). Marazzi et al. (2005) points out that exchange rate pass-through 
is lowered by an increase of imports from countries with fixed exchange rate, such as 
China. However exchange rate pass-through is affected only by other exporting countries? 
The emerging role oflocal subsidiaries is seen in Figures 16 and 17 and we cannot miss its 
role. In addition, exchange rate pass-through can be affected by market structure. We are 
going to discuss about them. 
2 Note that our exchange rate pass-through is based on contractual prices, not on the 
domestic currency. 
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In this chapter, we construct a partial equilibrium model with four types of firms: a 
home country firm, foreign firm 1, foreign firm 2, and a local subsidy of foreign firm 1. 
Since the exchange rate for foreign country 2 is pegged to the currency of the home country, 
only foreign country firm 1 faces exchange rate fluctuations. We study two cases-perfect 
completion and oligopoly-and analyze the effect of (1) the share of foreign country 1, (2) 
share of the local subsidy of the firm in that country, (3) the share of foreign firm 2, and (4) 
exchange rate appreciation. Under perfect competition, exchange rate pass·through 
declines in all cases mainly because of lost market power. However, under oligopoly, 
exchange rate pass-through generally rises in all cases. 
We also conduct empirical tests on the result of the analytical model, using data for 
Japan. Basically, our estimation results are consistent with the perfect competition case. 
Japan's trade share has a positive impact on exchange rate pass-through while the share of 
overseas subsidiaries of Japanese firms has a negative effect. As Bergin and Feenstra 
(2007) show, China's share decreases exchange pass-through for Japan because China's 
currency is pegged to the U.S. dollar. An increase in China's trade share plays the same 
role as a rise in the share of U.S. domestic firms. Estimation results show that yen 
appreciation also has a negative impact on exchange rate pass-through as predicted in the 
perfect competition case. However, its effect is subtle. Note that partial equilibrium model 
and its empirical test in this chapter depend on my presentation and data in discussion 
group in Cabinet Office of Japan. 
Finally, a three-country static general equilibrium model is constructed based on the 
study by Bergin and Feenstra (2002). We add local subsidiaries competing with exporting 
countries in the model and incorporate the effect of domestic firms. Intuitively, local 
subsidiaries and a fixed exchange rate country have the same effect, and the former 
moderates exchange rate pass-through through intensified competition. Calibration 
results also suggest that exchange rate pass-through is lowered not only by foreign 
countries, but also by local subsidiaries. 
Marazzi et al. (2005) find a sustained decline in exchange rate pass-through for U.S. 
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import prices from 0.5 in the 1980s to 0.2 in the 2000s. They separate a direct effect, which 
is regular exchange rate pass-through, from an indirect effect, which is the effect of 
commodity prices on export prices. They argue that recent declines in exchange rate 
pass-through are due to the indirect effect and a rise in China's share. Unfortunately, they 
do not construct a theoretical model and fail to present the reason why these factors affect 
exchange rate pass-though. 
Bergin and Feenstra (2007) develop a three-country model with the United States, 
Mexico, and Canada. Their model focuses on the interplay between Mexican and Chinese 
exporters to the U.S. Based on the model, they test whether greater competition from 
China results in a lower pass-through coefficient at the industry level and find support for 
the hypothesis. However, their model implies that pass-through is low regardless of the 
direction of the exchange rate movement. The result depends on their model specification 
in which they include China's share but do not consider competing countries' share. Our 
specification addresses this problem. 
3.1 Partial equilibrium model 
In this section, we first construct a partial equilibrium model and compare the effect of 
four factors: (1) the share of an exporting country with a floating exchange rate, (2) the 
share of foreign exporting country's local subsidiaries in that country, (3) the share an 
exporting country with a fixed exchange rate, and (4) currency appreciation. We analyze 
them for perfect competition and oligopoly. 
Second, a general equilibrium model is constructed. In the model, exchange rates, the 
share of countries, and the number of firms are endogenous, and they are affected by 
monetary policy. We will check its effect on exchange rate pass-through in the next section. 
With these two models, we would like to show that exchange rate pass-through can be 
influenced by competition from not only foreign exporters, but also domestic competitors. 
We extend the models studied by Shibayama et al. (1989) and Feenstra et al. (1993). We 
consider the market for a single good. The demand for the good is X(p,I) where pis its 
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price in the home country and I is total expenditure. This good is consumed only in the 
home country. Suppose that there are four firms which sell the product in the home 
market-a domestic firm, foreign firm 1, foreign firm2, and the local subsidiary of foreign 
firm 1. The sales of these firms are denoted by xh,x11 ,x12 ,x1sf and 
X = xh + x 11 + x 12 + x1~1 . We assume that firms treat total expenditure I as fixed. For each 
firm, marginal cost denominated in its own currency is denoted by C;. Suppose that the 
currency of foreign country 2 is pegged to the home currency. Then, marginal cost for 
foreign firm 2, c 12 , is in home currency. In addition, the local subsidiary of foreign firm 1 
produces the good in the home country. Thus, its marginal cost clfc is also in home 
currency. Let e denote the exchange rate between the currencies of the home country and 
foreign country 1. 
3.1.1 Perfect competition case 
For foreign firm 1, its profit function is as follows. 
where export price p, which is taken as given. From first order condition for the production 
in foreign country 1, export price is equal to its marginal cost. 
With this condition, foreign firm 1 sets its supply function as x 11 = S = S{p I e). Note 
that its price elasticity of supply is a 11 , and the price elasticity of demand in foreign 
country 1 is & m1 • 
In equilibrium, the demand function for foreign firm 1, R = R{p), is equal to supply: 
R(p) = S(p /e) . Taking logarithms of both sides and differentiating with respect to ln e , we 
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have the expression for exchange rate pass-through Pc as follows. 
Pc =8lnP/8lne. 
Under market equilibrium conditions, exchange rate pass-through is 
8lnR(p) 8Inp ainS(pje) 8ln(pje) 
ainp 8lne - ain(pje) 8lne 
~ 8lnR(p) 8lnp = 8lnS(pje)[alnp _ 1]. 
8lnp alne 8ln(pje) 8lne 
~ 8 8lnp =-u [alnp _ 1] 
/I 8lne /I alne . 
alnp afl 
~--= (3.1) 
8lne a11 +&11 
The price elasticity of demand in foreign country 1 depends on the price elasticity of 
demand in home country & and the price elasticity of supply for the other firms a; as 
seen in the equation below. 
&+ ~ Oa 
L...i,i¢/) I I (3.2) 8 JI = . 
(}fl 
Note that (}; denotes the market share of each firm. By substituting Equation (3.2) into 
Equation (3.1), we have 
As seen in the above equation, exchange rate pass-through depends on the price 
elasticity of demand and supply as well as market share offoreign firm 1. 
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Suppose that the price elasticity of demand and supply is nonnegative, that is, 
e,a; ;;::: 0 for all i Then, we know the following. 
1. A rise in the market share of foreign firm 1 leads to an increase in exchange rate 
pass-through. This effect is called the "share effect''. 
2. Suppose that a lfl ;;::: a 11 . Then, even if there is no change in the market share of 
foreign firm 1 and its local subsidiary combined, a rise in the share of the local 
subsidiary decreases exchange rate pass-through. 
3. Suppose that a 12 ~ a h, a 11 , a lfl . Then, exchange rate pass-through falls when 
foreign firm 2 increases its market share, given that output of the other firms is fixed. 
4. An appreciation of the exchange rate decreases exchange rate pass-through because a 
rise in marginal cost reduces the market share of foreign firm 1. 
3.1.2 Oligopoly case 
Let us now consider an oligopoly case. For simplicity, marginal cost is assumed to be 
constant, that is, C; '(x;) = c; for all i. Price in the home country is p = P(X) where 
X = xh + x 11 + x 12 + xlf1. This is a Cournot oligopoly market. The profit function of each 
firm is as follows. 
Homecountryfirm: ;rh =P(xh +x11 +x12 +xlfJxh -chxh. 
Foreign country 1 firm: 1r 11 = P(xh + x 11 + x 12 + xlf1 Xx 11 + xlf1 )- ec 11x 11 - clf1xlf1. 
Foreign country 2 firm: 1r 12 = P(xh + x 11 + x 12 + Xlf1 )x 12 - c 12x 12 . 
The FOCs of each firm are as follows. 
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Foreign country 1 firm: an /I I ax fl = P' X fl + p- ec /I = 0. 
Foreign country 2 firm: an /2 ;an /2 = P' X /2 + p- c /2 = 0. 
By solving the FOCs, we have the following response functions. 
xh = rh(x1"x12 ,xlfJ 
' 
With the FOCs, exchange rate pass-through 1s derived m the following way (see 
Appendix C.1). 
where E =X P"(X)j P'(X) is the elasticity of demand. 
Proposition 1 
If & > 0 and if E is fixed and non-negative, exchange rate pass-through decreases 
when the market share of foreign country 1 increases. 
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Now, let us consider the case in which foreign firm 1 allocates more production to its 
local subsidiary. Here, exchange rate pass-through is derived with the assumption that 
output of foreign firm 1 and its local subsidy changes. The following shows the result (see 
Appendix C.2). 
Proposition 2 
If s > 0 and if E is fixed, exchange rate pass-through decreases when foreign country 
1 increases the market share of the local subsidiary and decreases the share of foreign firm 
1. 
Proof. Since foreign firm 1 transfers its output from foreign country 1 to its local subsidiary, 
(} 11 decreases, and (}If' increases while (B 11 + (} 11 ) is held constant. Then, we have 
apo l(xh,Xfz~fixed jaB!, < 0 as long as (Bfl + (}JJ, s > 0' and E are fixed. The proof 
completes. 
Finally, we consider the effects of an increase in the market share of foreign firm 2 and of 
the exchange rate on exchange rate pass-through. For this purpose, exchange rate 
pass-through is derived with the assumption that all output varies. The result is the 
following (see Appendix C.3). 
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Proposition 3 
Suppose that a fall in the market share of firm 1 resulting from an increase in output of 
firm 2 is sufficiently small such that 2 + E(ao fl I ar f2 ) > 0 ' and that 
(I+E012 }2+E(a011 Iar12 )j+(2+E01J-E(a012 1&1z)j>O. Then, if &>0 and if E 
is fixed, exchange rate pass-through rises when foreign firm 2 increases its market share 
while the share of other firms does not increase. 
Proof. see Appendix C.4. 
Proposition 4 
Suppose that the decline in the market share of foreign firm 1 resulting from a currency 
appreciation is sufficiently small such that (2 + E ao fl I ae) > 0. In addition, the other 
firms increase their share, or a fall in their market share is less than the share loss of 
foreign firm 1. Then, if & > 0 and if E is fixed, exchange rate pass-through increases 
when the exchange rate is appreciated. 
Proof. see Appendix C.5. 
Based on the result of the partial equilibrium model, in all cases the sign of coefficients 
are expected to be different between perfect competition and oligopoly. Note that these 
theoretical results deeply depend on the assumptions. We test our analytical results in the 
next section. 
3.2 Estimation Result 
3.2.2 Estimation equation 
The equation used for estimation is derived by approximating the analytical result of the 
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partial equilibrium model. See Appendix C.6 for details. 
3.2.3 Estimation result 
For the data discussed in the previous section, let PX~, YAPJ, SJ~, SJL~, SC~, 
WCPI~, and APC~ denote the cumulative indices of export prices (contractual basis, 
taxes excluded), yen-appreciation period, share for Japan, share for Japan including 
foreign subsidiaries' sales, share for China, and adjusted production cost which is 
exchange rate multiplied by the corporate goods price index. 
We initially consider the following regression in Table4. 
InPX~ = a 1 + f31 InAPC~ + f32 In(APC~ * SJ~ )+ f33 In(APC~ * SJE1 ) 
+ f34 ln(APC~ * SC~ )+ f35 InWCP/1 +£~, (3.4) 
Generally, we need to include the world average price of goods which competes with 
exports from Japan. However, it is impossible to obtain world price indices that are 
consistent with Japanese export categories. Thus, we substitute WCPI, the world 
consumer price index, for it. 
Table 4 shows the result for our monthly samples, which range from January 1989 
through December 2006. The yen-appreciation period is not taken into account in Table 4. 
The interaction between adjusted production cost and Japan's share is positive. The 
interaction between adjusted production cost and Japan's share (only overseas 
subsidiaries) is negative. The interaction between adjusted production cost and China's 
share is negative. All coefficients of both fixed effect and random effect models are 
significant. The result is perfectly in line with the prediction of the perfect competition 
case. 
Next, we include the yen-appreciation period. Table 5 shows that the signs of the 
coefficients of Japan's share, its overseas subsidiaries' share and China's share are the 
same as those in Table 4 for both the fixed effect and random effect models. The sign of the 
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coefficient of the term associated with the yen-appreciation period is negative, which 
matches the result of the perfect competition case. However, the impact of the term is 
small. The result matches the prediction of the perfect competition case. 
Our result is consistent with results obtained by Bergin and Feenstra (2007) and 
Marazzi et al. (2005) because our estimation implies a decline in Japan's exchange rate 
pass-through, and the signs for the market share of an exporting country and that for 
China's share match their results. Moreover, Japanese firms' overseas subsidiaries and yen 
appreciation have a negative impact on exchange rate pass-through. The estimated results 
also match our perfect competition case. 
3.3 General Equilibrium Model 
In the previous section, we see the role of subsidiaries of foreign country by introducing 
partial equilibrium model. We constructed general equilibrium model that included 
endogenous entry and markup decisions by firms. Bergin and Feenstra (2007) studied the 
effect of market share of foreign firms with fixed exchange rate. Our main object is to show 
that foreign country's subsidiaries, which is located in home country, plays the same role as 
firms offoreign country with fixed exchange rate. The mode is developed in Appendix C.7. 
In this section, we discuss calibration result. 
3.3.1 Calibration result 
The calibration result is shown in Table 6. We see that the number of Japanese firms 
declines while the number of Chinese and Japanese local subsidiaries increases. Exchange 
rate pass-through also falls after an increase in U.S. money supply. A reduction of 
exchange rate pass-through is interpreted as a result of greater competition. The more 
competitive environment is partially a result of the existence of Japanese local subsidiaries. 
Table 6 suggests that exchange rate pass-through can decrease due to competition which 
not only comes from foreign exporters but also from domestic competitors. Also, the 
calibration result supports the empirical result of the partial equilibrium model. 
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Chapter 4 
An analysis of factors affecting relative wage 
In Chapter 4, we study relative wage. In developed countries, the premium for higher 
education is not continually rising. The relative wage of skilled to unskilled labor in the 
manufacturing sector for some developed countries is shown in Table 7. Relative wage in 
the U.S. and Germany increased while relative employment of skilled to unskilled labor 
also rose. This can be explained by a greater increase in the demand for skilled labor than 
in the supply of skilled labor. On the contrary, Table 7 shows that Japan, the UK and 
France faced a decline in the relative wage when relative employment rose. 
In all countries, the wage share of skilled labor is increasing. For countries with an 
increasing relative wage, the demand for skilled labor exceeds the supply as Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999) explains. This can be interpreted that even though the demand for skilled 
labor increases, the relative wage declines if the supply of skilled labor exceeds the 
demand. 
It is well known that labor supply and demand can be decomposed into a 
between-industry effect and within-industry effect. Do these effects work differently in 
developed countries? If these effects work in the same way, what factors account for 
different growth patterns in the demand and supply of skilled labor? 
Let the compensation for skilled and unskilled labor be Wh, ~ , respectively. Let the 
labor hours for skilled and unskilled labor be H h, H1 , respectively. From the definition of 
relative wage, we have 
Relative wage= [whj HJ/[~ / H,] 
= [wh;w,l/[Hh/ H,]. 
The log of the relative wage is as follows. 
32 
In(Relative wage)= In[Wh /~] -ln[Hh / H1] 
~ In[Wageshare]-In[Employment sharel 
Here wage share is share of wage of skilled labor and employment share is share of 
skilled labor in hours. 
Then, the log change in the relative wage becomes 
dln(Relative wage)~ dln[Wageshare]-dln[Employment sharel (4.1) 
The equation shows that the log change in the relative wage is decomposed into that in 
the wage share and that in employment share. In equation (4.1), the first term is 
interpreted as the relative demand for skilled labor and the second term as the relative 
supply of skilled labor. 
Figure 25 shows that labor services per hour worked in total industry grew faster in 
Japan and France than in the U.S., UK, Germany, and Italy. However, Figure 26 shows 
that labor services per hour worked in the manufacturing sector grew almost at the same 
rate in all countries except Italy. This relationship is seen in Table 9, Table 10, Table 11 
and Table 12. For example, from 1980 to 2004, in total industry, employment of skilled 
labor averagely increased 0.45 in the U.S. and 0.50 in Japan respectively. In 
manufacturing sector, it increased 0.43 in the U.S. and 0.52 in Japan. Employment of 
skilled labor increased faster in Japan than in the U.S. by 0.09. When we see change in the 
share of skilled labor, in total industry, from 1980 to 2004 the share of skilled labor 
averagely increased 0.79 in the U.S. and 0.63 in Japan respectively. In the manufacturing 
sector, it averagely increased 0.79 in the U.S. and 0.48 in Japan respectively. The wage 
share of skilled labor increased faster in the U.S. than in Japan by 0.31. Therefore, in the 
manufacturing sector the differences in the relative wage among the developed countries 
are relatively attributed to the change in the share of skilled labor. Then we focused on the 
change in the share of skilled labor in the analysis. 
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Next, we discuss whether between-industry effect or within-industry effect is larger for 
rise of the wage share of skilled labor and employment of skilled labor? If a 
between-industry effect dominates a within-industry effect, an increase in the supply of 
skilled labor is absorbed by a structural change in industry, that is, growth in industries 
intensive in high-skilled labor. If a within-industry effect dominates a between-industry 
effect, increased supply of skilled labor is to be absorbed mainly by a rise in the demand for 
skilled labor inside each industry. By following Fukao et al. (2009), the relative supply of 
skilled labor can be decomposed into the between-industry effect and within-industry 
effect. 
Let m; (t) and w; (t) be the skilled labor employment and wage rate in the i th 
industry at year t, respectively. Let m(t) and w(t) be the average skilled labor 
employment and average wage rate in a country in year t from the EU KLEMS database, 
respectively. Similarly to the Divisia quantity index, we assume that the level of skilled 
labor employment for a given wage rate does not vary. The skilled labor employment in the 
i th industry in year t is defined as follows. 
() w;(t) () m; t = w(t) m t . 
By using working hours of each industry as a weight, we define a new skilled labor 
employment index as follows. 
By first taking differences in time, we can decompose the change in skilled labor 
employment into the between-industry and within-industry effects. 
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(4.2) 
The first term in equation (4.2) represents the between-industry effect and the second 
term the within-industry effect. The results of our analysis of the skilled labor employment 
decomposition are reported in Tables 9 and 10. Table 9 shows that for total industry the 
within-industry effect is always positive and is larger than the between-industry effect, 
except for Italy during the 1980-1989 period. Table 10 is for the manufacturing sector and 
shows almost the same result. This implies that skilled labor employment is absorbed 
mainly into the within-industry effect in most countries. 
Let us now consider the wage share of skilled labor. Figures 27 and 28 show the wage 
share of skilled labor for total industry and that for the manufacturing sector, respectively. 
While in most countries the wage share of skilled labor is higher for total industry than 
that for the manufacturing sector, the rate of increase seems to be the same for in both 
total industry and the manufacturing sector. 
Similarly to skilled labor employment, we decompose the wage share into the 
between-industry and within-industry effects and compare it with the result for skilled 
labor employment. The wage share of skilled labor is decomposed in the following way. The 
wage share in the i th industry in year t is denoted by S; (t). The wage share for total 
industry can be defined as the following. 
~( )-~ H;(t)[w;(t) ( )] 
S t - L.,. ( ) ( ) S; t . ; H t wt 
Similarly to equation (4.2), the change in the wage share is expressed as follows. 
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~( l)- ~( )- "'.!_(H;(t+l) H;(t))[(w;(t+l) ( t))-(w;(t) ( ))] 
S f + S I - LJ ( ) + ( ) .. J ) S; f + w( ) S; I ; 2 Ht+1 Ht w~+l t 
+ L .!_[(w;(t+l) s (t+l))+(w;(t) s (t))](H;(t+l) _ H;(t))· 
i 2 w(t + 1) I w(t) I H(t + 1) H(t) 
(4.3) 
The first term in equation (4.3) represents the between·industry effect and the second 
term the within·industry effect. 
The results of our analysis of the wage share decomposition are reported in Tables 11 
and 12. Table 11 shows that for total industry the within·industry effect is always positive 
and is larger than the between-industry effect, except for France during the 2000·04 period. 
Table 12 is for the manufacturing sector and shows almost the same result. This implies 
that the rise in the wage share of skilled labor is also absorbed mainly into the 
within·industry effect in most countries. The result that the within-industry effect always 
dominates the between-industry effect is the same as the result for skilled labor 
employment. Bernard and Jensen (1997) also show that for employment and wages, the 
within-industry effect dominates the between-industry effect in the U.S. from 1973 to 1987. 
Then we focus on the within-industry effect for estimation. 
Let us discuss changes in the manufacturing sector, following Feenstra and Hanson 
(2001). The rise in the wage share of skilled labor in the U.S. is the highest among the six 
countries. The skilled labor employment of Japan and France increased faster than that of 
the U.S. while the wage share of skilled labor in those countries increased less than that in 
the U.S. Since we have more detailed data, we focus on Japan as a country whose relative 
wage behaves oppositely to that of the U.S. To explain the within-industry effect, by 
following Feenstra and Hanson (2001), we construct a model in which an increase in 
intermediate input is neutral to the demand for skilled labor. Skilled labor can increase or 
decrease as a result of an increase in intermediate input purchases from abroad. In 
addition, we introduce the decision on the assembly location into the model and assume 
that the workers in the assembly process are unskilled. Therefore, if firms want to keep 
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their assembly factories inside the country, then the demand for unskilled labor does not 
decrease even with an increase in intermediate input purchases from abroad. The model of 
Feenstra and Hanson (2001) implies that an increase in the outsourcing of intermediate 
input increases the incentive to relocate assembly factories outside the country. This is 
because they assume that the assembly process uses neither human capital nor physical 
capital. Our model assumes that the assembly process uses human capital and is intensive 
in unskilled labor. Then, an increase in the outsourcing of intermediate input raises the 
relative demand for skilled labor by diminishing intermediate input, which is intensive in 
unskilled labor, and also reduces the relative demand for skilled labor by raising the level 
of assembly activities. Thus, an increase in intermediate input does not necessarily 
promote skill upgrading. That is, by outsourcing intermediate input, some countries would 
concentrate on assembling intermediate components using mainly unskilled labor. 
The estimation results show the effect of structural variables on the share of skilled 
labor within an industry. Tables 13 and 14 show that the estimated coefficient for IT 
capital is significant and positive for the U.S. and Japan, while that for total outsourcing is 
not significant for both countries. We decompose outsourced input into energy input, 
material input, and service input. The estimated coefficient for material input is 
significant and positive for the U.S., while that for the other two intermediate inputs is not 
significant. As for Japan, the estimated coefficient for service input and energy input is 
negative and significant; however, that for material input is not significant. This result 
implies that the U.S. can increase the share of high-skilled labor by outsourcing low-skilled 
intermediate input, but the share of high-skilled labor in Japan can be reduced by 
outsourcing. Table 15 shows estimation results which introduce the decision on the 
assembly process location. The estimated coefficient for the ratio of workers in the 
assembly process is negative and significant, and that for intermediate purchases from 
abroad is also negative and significant. This implies that in Japan the manufacturing 
sector's demand for skilled labor is, contrary to the case of the U.S., decreased due to an 
increase in intermediate input purchases from abroad by strong intensity of assembly 
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process location. This intensity explains the slow pace in the growth of the wage share of 
skilled labor. 
Then we check whether industries intensive in skilled labor are promoted through 
comparative advantage or not by measuring comparative advantage and skilled labor 
intensity. Japan has a comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector which is more 
intensive in low-skilled labor than that in the U.S. Figures 29 and 30 show the 
comparative advantage index for Japan and the U.S. As the figures show, Japan has a 
comparative advantage in industries intensive in low-skilled labor, whereas the U.S. has a 
comparative advantage in industries intensive in high-skilled labor. Figure 29 implies that 
Japan tends to specialize in production in low-skilled industries as trade with the U.S 
increases. Subsidies seem to contribute to the survival of low-skilled industries in the 
market. Figure 31 shows that low-skilled industries receive larger subsidies than 
high-skilled industries. Because of this, the Japanese government might be inducing 
skilled workers to find jobs in low-skilled industries. Note that the model and its empirical 
test in this chapter depend on my presentation and data in discussion group in Cabinet 
Office of Japan. 
Feenstra and Hanson (2001) argue that international trade is an important 
explanation for the increase in the wage gap and admit that a massive influx of computers 
in the workplace and other forms of technological change are the cause. As for Japan, 
Sakurai (2000) provides a pioneering analysis for evaluating the effect of outsourcing. 
Sakurai (2000) and Ito and Fukao (2005a) use data for 1990s, but fail to show a significant 
positive effect of outsourcing on the demand for skilled labor. However, by using data up to 
early 2000s, Ito and Fukao (2005b) and Yamashita (2006) found that Japan's vertical trade 
with Asian countries had a positive impact on the demand for skilled labor. Tanaka and 
Nakazawa (2007) also fmd that trade with lower income countries increases wages for 
skilled workers. 
In this context, our result is the opposite of these recent results. This is because we use 
data for Japan's trade with both lower and higher income countries and incorporate the 
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assembly process into our theory. 
4.1 The model explaining the within industry effect 
To analyze the within·industry effect we basically follow the model by Feenstra and 
Hanson (2001). As we have seen in the previous section, the within-industry effect plays a 
far more important role in the variation of the relative wage. This section discusses the 
model to analyze the within-industry effect. 
First, a production function is defined. We assume that both skilled labor-intensive 
input and unskilled labor-intensive input are self-manufactured in a factory or imported. 
Contrary to Feenstra and Hanson (2001), we assume that final manufacturing products 
use unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital. A cost minimization problem is then set up. 
Finally, after the minimization, the cost function is transformed into a translog cost 
function using a quadratic approximation, and the factor share is introduced by using 
Shephard's lemma. 
The above assumption on the production function has two implications. First, the 
relative increase in the import of unskilled labor-intensive intermediate input can increase 
the relative demand for skilled labor. The opposite is also true. Secondly, a rise in final 
manufacturing products may decrease the relative demand for skilled labor. This reflects 
the modularization of the manufacturing process for the final products. In reality, at 
factories in many developing countries, such as maquiladoras in Mexico, fmal 
manufacturing products are assembled mainly by unskilled workers. Of course, final 
manufacturing products may increase the demand for skilled labor in, for example, the 
research and development sector. 
Suppose that there are three goods (yP y 2 , y m), unskilled labor-intensive intermediate 
input, skilled labor-intensive intermediate input, and final manufacturing products in 
manufacturing sector m, respectively. Suppose that all products are made in the same 
factory, and that x1 and x2 of y1 and y 2 , respectively, can be imported or exported. 
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The production function for intermediate input is Y; = J; (L;, H;, K;) for i=1,2; where L, 
H, and K represents low-skilled labor input, high-skilled labor input, and capital input, 
respectively. The final manufacturing product, y m , is produced by combining two types of 
net intermediate input, (y1 -xpy2 -x2 ), using(Lb,Hb,Kb). Our production function 
for the final manufacturing product is Ym = JJy1 -x1,y2 -x2 ,Lb,Hb,Kh) . The 
manufacturing process for the final product is intensive in unskilled labor. Then, the sum 
of all factor input for producing intermediate inputs is the total input in manufacturing 
Next, we conduct an analysis for the short-run using a cost minimization problem in 
which firms are given their input prices. As in Feenstra and Hanson (2001), "the difficulty 
with using this 'aggregate production function' for any empirical or theoretical work is that 
it implicitly holds fixed the level of labor and capital used in the industry." Cost 
minimization is a necessary condition for profit maximization, and as long as the firm is a 
price taker in its input market, the result from the cost minimization problem is valid. 
Thus, our analysis is based on a cost minimization problem. 
In the short-run, we assume the level of output and capital is fixed. The cost 
minimization problem for industry m is as follows. 
where w is the wage for low-skilled labor, q is the wage for high-skilled labor, and z is the 
shift parameter of production function. The shift parameter is a factor which affects 
production function, such as IT investment and intermediate material input. However, 
these factors are hard to adjust in the short-run, and we assume that those factors are 
exogenous in the cost minimization problem for the short-run. Note that the production 
function is normalized by the price of the final manufacturing product, pm, and Ym is real 
value added or real output. 
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Next, we discuss the setup for estimation. By solving equation (4.4), we have the 
following cost function. 
(4.5) 
The functional form of this cost function needs to be specified. Since we do not need to 
put a restriction on the substitution elasticity and our estimation is based on factor prices, 
we choose translog cost function using a quadratic approximation as follows. 
I 1 I J I K 
InC= a 0 +I a; lnx; +-LLa!i lnx; lnx1 + LLP;k lnx; lnzk 
i=l 2 i=l j=l i=l k=! (4.6) 
K 1 K L 
+ LY; lnz; +-LLYki lnzk lnz1• 
k=l 2 k=! I=! 
where Xi denotes the wage for low-skilled labor, wage for high-skilled labor, physical capital, 
output, and relative price in equation (4.5). 
From the homogeneity of the wages and the symmetric property of the coefficients, we 
put the following restrictions. 
I I J I a; = 1, La!i = La!i =0, a!i = a 1;. 
i=l i=l j=l 
With Shephard's lemma, the cost share of factor i can be derived by differentiating 
(4.6) with respect to In X;. Therefore, 
J K 
si = ai + Iaij lnxj + LPik lnzk. (4.7) 
J=l k=l 
Again, in Feenstra and Hanson (2001) wage differences across industries have subtle 
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impacts on the wage share, as they do also in Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994). Then 
we eliminate the wage for skilled labor and unskilled labor from (4. 7). 
4.2 Estimation Results 
4.2.1 Within-industry effect 
Before estimation, we take differences of equation (4. 7) to make it stationary. 
J K 
M; =a;+ La!i~lnx1 + L~k~lnzk. (4.8) 
j=l k=l 
Since we focus on the change of the share of skilled labor, we estimate the following 
equation. 
m = 1,-··,M. (4.9) 
Table 13 and Table 14 show the estimates of equation (4.9) for the U.S. and Japanese 
manufacturing sector. Our estimation is based on annual EU KLEMS data from 1990 to 
2005. In the regression, high-skilled labor is regarded as skilled labor, low· and 
medium-skilled labor is regarded as unskilled labor. The dependent variable is the log 
change in the wage share of skilled labor in an industry. For total manufacturing, the wage 
share of skilled labor increased from 26.8 percent to 40.2 percent in the U.S. and from 19.0 
percent to 27.0 percent in Japan. 
We follow the specification used by Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and Feenstra 
and Hanson (200 1). Although both studies used shipments for each industry as regressors, 
the output for each industry is used for the estimation in our model. That is, the 
capital/shipment ratio is replaced by the capital/output ratio. In our specification there are 
two capital/output ratios: capital services volume indices divided by gross output volume 
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indices, and (nominal) capital compensation divided by gross output at current prices. 
Feenstra and Hanson (2001) use imported intermediate input as a share of total materials 
purchases as foreign outsourcing. Due to the availability of data, we use intermediate 
input as outsourcing. In addition, intermediate input is decomposed into energy, material, 
and service. The effects of these three factors on the wage share of skilled labor are tested 
in the model. IT capital is also included in the model. The EU KLEMS database provides 
variables measuring the share of IT capital compensation and the total amount of capital 
compensation. We constructed the variable for IT capital by multiplying these two 
variables for each industry. Unlike Feenstra and Hanson (2001), regressions are not 
weighted by the industry share of the total manufacturing wage bill. Note that 
intermediate input in our model includes the purchases from the domestic market. Thus, 
an increase in intermediate input might raise the demand for skilled labor and unskilled 
labor in a country. 
Table 13 is the estimation result of the U.S. and Table 14 is that of Japan. In the first 
and second columns, the result for total intermediate input is reported. The regressors of 
regression 1 are real capital services divided by real output, real output, total outsourcing, 
and IT capital. The regressors of regression 2 are nominal capital services divided by 
nominal output, nominal output, total outsourcing, and IT capital. In the third and fourth 
columns, the result for decomposed intermediate input is reported. The regressors of 
regression 3 are real capital services divided by real output, real output, outsourcing of 
energy, outsourcing of material, outsourcing of service, and IT capital. The regressors of 
regression 4 are nominal capital services divided by nominal output, nominal output, 
outsourcing of energy, outsourcing of material, outsourcing of service, and IT capital. Our 
analysis uses the log change in all variables. 
For the U.S., IT capital has a positive impact on an increase in the wage share of 
high-skilled labor. Outsourcing also has a positive impact in regression 2, and the 
coefficient for material intermediate input is positive and significant in regression 4. These 
results are consistent with Feenstra and Hanson (2001). The estimation result for IT 
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capital for Japan is almost the same as that in the U.S. In regressions 2 and 4, its 
coefficient is positive and significant. However, the result for outsourcing differs from that 
of the U.S. As to total intermediate input, the coefficients are negative, although in 
regression 2 it is not significant. In regressions 3 and 4, the coefficient for intermediate 
material input is insignificant and that for service intermediate service input is negative 
and significant. This result for intermediate input implies that an increase in intermediate 
input does not raise the wage share of skilled labor, or even decreases it. That is, contrary 
to theory, with an increase in intermediate input, the wage share for skilled labor might 
fall. 
Table 15 shows estimation results which add the decision on the assembly process 
location and excluded intermediate input from domestic firms. In the table, dProd 
represents the difference of production process and related workers' ratio. The estimated 
coefficient for the ratio of workers in the assembly process is negative and significant, and 
that for intermediate purchases from abroad is also negative and significant. This implies 
that in Japan the manufacturing sector's demand for skilled labor is, contrary to the case 
of the U.S., decreased due to an increase in intermediate input purchases from abroad by 
its industry structure which attracts assembly process. This industry structure is 
explained by the relationship between comparative advantage and skilled labor intensity. 
Comparative advantage is defined in the following way: (i) labor productivity (=LP) is 
calculated by value added divided by total hours worked in a industry, (ii) the 
denomination of labor productivity is converted from the Japanese yen to U.S. dollars 
using PPP (1997, EU KLEMS), (iii) the industry whose U.S. dollar labor productivity is 
closest in Japan and the U.S. is chosen and defined as standard industry I, (iv) the degree 
of comparative advantage is calculated with ~LP;,Japan I LPI,Japan .1/lLP;,U S. I LPI,U.S. n for 
Figures 29 and 30. Note that in step (iv), we use the Japanese yen for LP;,Japan and U.S. 
dollars for LP;,u.s .. 
Relative skilled labor intensity (=SWS) is defined as (swsi,Japan I swsi,U S.) for Figure 
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29. For Figure 30, (swsi,u.s jSWSi,JapaJ. 
Figures 29 and 30 show the relationship between the comparative advantage index 
and skilled labor intensity in the U.S. and Japan. Industries in the first quadrant are 
intensive in skilled labor and have a comparative advantage. On the other hand, industries 
in the third quadrant are not intensive in skilled labor and do not have a comparative 
advantage. The U.S. has 19 industries in the first quadrant while Japan has only 5 
industries. This implies that Japan has a comparative advantage in industries intensive in 
unskilled labor. 
Japanese government's industry policy might support industries intensive in unskilled 
labor. Figure 31 shows that such industries receive more subsidies than industries 
intensive in skilled labor. In other words, the Japanese government promotes industries 
intensive in unskilled labor, but not industries intensive in skilled labor. 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
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We study in chapter 2 the effect of capital accumulation on emerging economies with 
default risk. We build a dynamic stochastic model in which an SOE can choose 
consumption and investment facing productivity shocks which follow a Markov process. 
Default probability is endogenous because the event of default depends on the value 
functions for default and non-default cases in the model. 
In simulation results, the model matches stylized facts observed in Argentina, such as 
procyclicality of consumption and investment, countercyclicality of net exports and high 
volatility in the consumption relative to output. In addition, the model solved three 
unsolved stylized facts, such as negative correlation between investment and net exports, 
procyclicality of investment, and current account reversals. Current account reversals 
occur because negative productivity shock caused an interest rate spike by arising from 
default risk. 
In Chapter3, we study what factors affect exchange rate pass-through that Japanese 
firms face. Constructing models under perfect competition and oligopoly, we analyze the 
effect of four factors (1) Japan's share, (2) China's share, (3) share of overseas subsidiaries 
of Japanese firms, and (4) yen appreciation. 
The partial equilibrium model implies that under perfect competition, Japan's share 
increases exchange rate pass-through, but that other factors decrease it mainly because of 
the share effect. On the contrary, under oligopoly Japan's share decreases exchange rate 
pass-through, but other factors increase it. 
The estimation result of the partial equilibrium model generally supports the results 
of the perfect competition case. Japan's share increases exchange rate pass-through, but 
China's share, a production transfer from Japan to overseas subsidiaries of Japanese firms, 
and yen appreciation decrease exchange rate pass-through. 
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We also set up a three-country general equilibrium model in which the share for each 
country and exchange rate become endogenous. The share for a foreign country whose 
exchange rate is fixed and the share of local subsidiaries increase because of monetary 
expansion, while the share for a foreign country with a floating exchange rate decreases at 
the same time. Exchange rate pass-through also decreases. This matches the result of the 
partial equilibrium model. 
In Chapter 4, we study the relative wage in developed countries. Unlike the relative 
wage hike observed in the U.S., the relative wage in other developed countries has not 
necessarily increased. Since the supply of skilled labor rose from 1990 to 2005, the demand 
for skilled labor should differ across countries. Especially, the demand for skilled labor in 
Japan has not increased, and consequently the relative wage between skilled labor and 
unskilled labor has dropped. 
The demand for skilled labor can be decomposed into the within-industry effect and 
between-industry effect. Feenstra and Hanson (2001) constructed a simple model with 
intermediate input trade and showed that outsourcing and IT capital raised the wage 
share of skilled labor in the U.S. from 1979 to 1990. We have tested the same model with 
data from 1990 to 2005 for the U.S. and Japan. The result suggests that the wage share of 
skilled labor might not increase but rather might decrease with a rise in outsourcing. The 
result also suggests that Japan lacks a sector intensive in high-skilled labor, such as the 
research and development sector. 
We also have tried to explain the result above by showing that Japan has a 
comparative advantage in industries intensive in unskilled labor, whereas the U.S. has a 
comparative advantage in industries intensive in skilled labor. 
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Appendix A: Data 
A.1 Data for calibration 
Seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP, seasonally adjusted quarterly real gross capital 
formation, and annual labor supply are taken from the IFS. Since we have the first two 
series only from the first quarter of 1993, the calculation of TFP is possible from that 
quarter onward. We assume that labor supply is fixed within a year because the IFS does 
not provide quarterly labor supply. Data on annual capital stock are taken from 
Argentina's National Bureau of National Accounts. We take differences of annual physical 
capital and divide it by gross capital formation to obtain seasonal capital stock. The 
production function is assumed to be a simple Cobb· Douglas function. Capital stock shares 
are assumed to be 0.42 which is widely used value in the RBC literature. Then, TFP is 
computed. 
A.2 Data for estimation 
In chapter 3, we use the monthly export price index constructed by the Bank of Japan. 
The value of the index is set to 100 for 2005, and our data covers the period from January 
1980 to 2006. The export price index is based on contractual currency. The Corporate 
Goods Price Index from the Bank of Japan is used as an index capturing production costs 
(base year= 2005). The nominal effective exchange rate from the IFS (base year= 2000) is 
used as a measure of the exchange rate. The world consumer price index from the IFS is 
also used. To calculate annual shares for Japan and China, we use the United Nations 
Comtrade database for the period starting in 1980. To construct the annual share for 
Japan including foreign subsidiaries, we use the Survey of Overseas Business Activity 
(SOBA) compiled by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan. The survey 
reports sales of local subsidiaries and exports of their parent companies. Then, the annual 
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share for Japan including foreign subsidiaries is 
( EX _P+SL_LJ*( EX _J J EXP EXW' 
- -
where EX P and SL L denote exports of parent companies and sales of their 
foreign subsidiaries available in the SOBA, respectively, and EX_ J and EX W 
denote Japan's exports and world exports from the UN Comtrade, respectively. Since all 
share indices are annual data, they are unchanged within any year in our estimation. In 
addition, we define the period in which nominal exchange rates are above the average level 
for 1992 as the period of yen appreciation. 
In Chapter 4, data are mainly from the EU KLEMS database (available at 
http://www.euklems.net/). In the estimation, we regard medium-skilled labor and 
low-skilled labor as unskilled labor and high-skilled labor as skilled labor. The EU KLEMS 
database does not have intermediate purchases from abroad. We use an input-output table 
to calculate the ratio of imported intermediate input to total intermediate input. 
Multiplying the ratio by the intermediate input index, we obtain intermediate purchases 
from abroad. 
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Appendix B: Algorithm for computation in Chapter 2 
1. Current physical capital and bonds are discretized with 42 equally spaced points. 
Let the sequence of current physical capital and bonds be k = {kP k2 ,. • ·, k 42 } and 
b = {bpb2 ,-··,b4J , where k1 < k 2 < ··· < k42 and b1 < b2 < ··· < b42 Note that 
and are equal to {0.7 x k1995,1 , 1.4 x k2003,1 } and 
{(-0.7)xy2003,PO.lxy2003,1} where k andy areactualArgentina'sdata. 
2. Take discretized current physical capital ki and bonds bi from the current 
capital sequence. Start with some guess for the parameters to be calibrated: /3, p 
and a discretized state space for bonds consisting of 42 points equally spaced. 
Discretized current physical capital ki and bonds bi are given. 
3. Combine physical capital and bonds in the following manner. Let the sequence of 
discretized physical capital be k' = {k\ , k' 2 ,. · ·, k' 42 }, where k\ < k' 2 < · · · < k' 42 . In 
the same way, let the sequence of discretized bonds be b' = {b\ , b' 2 ,. · ·, b' 42 }, where 
b\ > b'2 > ··· > b'i > 0 > b'i+I > ··· > b'42 • It implies that the country can have 
positive bonds. Then, we have the combination of physical capital and bonds such 
that 
(k',b')= [(k\ ,b\),(k'2 ,b\1···,(k'42 ,b\1···,(k\ ,b'421(k'2 ,b'42),···,(k'42 ,b'42)] 
Then we have 42 X 42 combinations of physical capital and bonds and choose 
optimal one. Repeat it for all (ki, bi) 
4. Start with a guess for the bond price schedule such that q0 (b',k',A)=l/(l+r) 
for all b', k' and A with a given level of current physical capital k and 
bondholding b . 
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5. Given the bond price schedule and current physical capital, solve the optimal 
policy functions for the combination of future bonds b'(b,k,A;q) and future 
physical capital k'(b,k,A;q) and decide whether the country chooses to default or 
not to default via value function iterations. For each iteration for the value function 
we need to compute the value of a default which is endogenous because it depends 
on the value of the contract at b = 0 . We iterate the value function until a 
convergence occurs for a given q0 (b' ,k' ,A). 
6. Using default sets and repayment sets, compute a new bond price schedule 
q1 (b' ,k' ,A) such that lenders break even and compare it to the bond price schedule 
of the previous iteration: q0 (b', k' A) . If the convergence criterion, that is, 
maxk0 (b',k',A)-q1(b',k',A)}<c, is satisfied, algorithm ends. Otherwise, update 
the price schedule using a Gause-Siedel algorithm and return to step 3. 
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Appendix c: Exchange rate pass-through 
C.l Exchange rate pass-through for Proposition 1 
When other company's output is fixed, exchange rate pass·through is given by 
p 0 I (x X X 'flrxed = a In Po I a In e h• J1· /flF 
efle arfl(xh,xf2'xifl'e) (CAl) 
= &X ae 
By differentiating the FOC for foreign country firm 1 with respect to e, we have 
ar ar ar 
P' ' _______£!_ r 1 + P' _______£!_ + P' _______£!_ - c 1 = 0 Be 1 Be Be 1 
arfl arfl 
<::::>P"-r +2P'--c =0 Be 11 Be 11 (CBl) 
From the FOC, we have 
c11 =_!_(P'r11 +P) e . (CCI) 
By plugging (CCI) into (CBl), we have 
ar ar 1( ) P" _______£!_ r 1 + 2P' _______£!_ - - P' r 1 + P = 0 ae 1 ae e f 
<::::> Br11 (P''r + 2P')- _!_(P'r + P) 
a fl - /1 e e 
<::::> Br11 - _!_(P'r + P)1 ~(P"r + 2P') 
ae - e fl I, fl . (CDl) 
By plugging (CDl) into (CAl), we have 
P" 
where E=-X 
P' 
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C.2 Exchange rate pass-through for Proposition 2 
When (x h, x 12 ) is fixed, exchange rate pass-through is given by 
Pal(xh,xf,)=Jued = 8lnPj8lne 
= l + &ifl jfJrfl [-(}fie ()rfl (xh' X f2' X!fl' e)]· 
1- (ar1fl j8r1J&11 j&!fJ EX ae 
(CA2) 
By differentiating the FOC for foreign country firm 1 with respect to e, we have 
ar ar ar 
P' '____!!__ r 1 + P' ____!!__ + P' ____!!__ - c 1 = 0 ae 1 ae ae f 
arfl arfl 
<::::>P"--r +2P'---c =0 
ae fl ae fl (CB2) 
From the FOC, we have 
c JI = .!..(P'rJI + p) 
e 0 (CC2) 
By plugging (CC2) into (CB2), we have 
arfl arfl 1 ( ) P"--r 1 +2P'---- P'r 1 +P = 0. ae 1 ae e f 
<::::> 
8711 (P" r + 2P')- _!_ (P' r + P) ae fl - e fl 
<=> ar fl = _!_ (P' r + p) I(P" r + 2P') 
ae e 11 / 1 11 . (CD2) 
By differentiating the FOC for local subsidies of foreign country 1 with respect to r11 , 
we have 
P' 1+~ +P"rlf1 1+~ +P'~=O ( 8rJ ( 8rJ ar arfl arfl arfl 0 
ar 
<::::> (P'+P"+P')~ = -P'-P"1j11 • 
arfl 
(CE2) 
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By differentiating the FOC of foreign firm 1 with respect to r lf1 , we have 
8r ~ (P'+P"+P')____!2_ = -P'-P"r11 . 
arlf1 
8r ~ ____!2_ = -(P'+P"r1Jj(2P'+P"). (CF2) 8rlf1 
Using (CE2) and (CF2), we have 
1 + 8rlf1 j8r11 l1- (P'+P"rlfJj(2P'+P" rlf1 )j 
1- (arlf1j8r1J8r11 j8rlfJ = 1- [P'+P"rlfJ/(2P'+P")llP'+P"r1Jj(2P'+P")] 
[(P')j(2P'+ P' 'r lf1 )] 
=~~--------~--~~----~----~ 3(P')2 + P' P" r + P' P" r 2P'+P" r [1 lf1 lf1 
P'(2P'+P" r1J 
= r3(P')2 + P' P"r + P' P"r ]· ~ [1 lf1 
~(CG2) 
By plugging (CG2) and (CD2) into (CA2), we have 
P'(2P'+P"r ) [ () e 1 0 ~ P I - 11 _ __!.!__(P'r + P) (P''r + 2P') 
0 (x.,xf2)=[u:ed - [3(P'Y + P' P" rf1 + P' P" rlf1] t:X e [1 [1 
- P' [- 811 (P'r + P)l 
- [3(P')2 + P' P" r11 + P' P" rlf1] t:X 11 j 
= [3 + (P"/ rJrr: + (P''l P')r., J[-~ ('r• + ;. ) ] 
P" 
where E=--X 
P' 
~(CH2) 
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C.3 Exchange rate pass-through and proof of Proposition 3 
When output of all companies changes, exchange rate pass·through is given by 
Now, we use (CG2), 
1 + 8r!f1 l8r11 P'(2P'+P"r11 ) 
1- (ar!f1l8r1Jor1l 1ar!fJ = [3(P'f + P' P"r11 + P' P"r!f1) 
2 + (XP"/ P''ktl I X) 
= (3 + (XP"/ P'"J{11 1 X)+ (XP"/ P''j{!ftl X~ 
2 + E(}tt 
=---...::__-
~(CB3) 
In the same way, we have 
1 + or1zl8r11 P'(2P'+P"r1J 
1- (8r1z/&1J&12 lor!fJ = [3(P'Y + P' P"r11 + P' P"r12 ] 
2 + (XP"/ P''ir11 1 x) 
= [3 + (XP"/ r"J{11 1 x )+ (XP"/ P''Xr12 1 x )] 
2 + E(}tt 
= ___ _::_.::__ 
~(CC3) 
Using (CH2), we have 
(CA3) 
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[ 
2+EB11 ][ 2+EB11 l 
Po= 3+EB11 +EBif1 3+EBJ1 +EB/2 * 
11 11 P'r + P P''r + 2P' [ 
P'(2P'+P"r ) ][ e e 1 0 1 [3(P'Y + P' P"r11 + P' P"rJ - &X -;( 11 ) ( 11 ) 
~(CD3) 
56 
57 
(CAAl) 
(CBBl) 
(CCCI) 
(CDDl) 
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(CAAl): 
Since 80lf1j8r12 < 0 and 2+ E(8011 j8r12 )> 0 by assumption, (CAAl) is positive. 
(CBBl): 
Since(l + EB12 l2 + E(aB11 f8r12 )J+ (2 + EB11 l- E(aB12 f8r12 )J > 0 by assumption, (CBBl) 
is positive. 
(CCCI): 
Since 8011 f8r12 < 0, 8Bhj8r12 < 0 by assumption, (CCCI) is positive. 
(CDDl): 
Since 8011 j8r12 < 0 by assumption, (CDDl) is positive. 
The proof completes. 
C.5 Proof of Proposition 4 
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(CAA2) 
(CBB2) 
(CCC2) 
(CDD2) 
(CAA2): Since (2+EBB11 Ioe)> 0 and BB11 Ioe+BBif11Be < 0 by assumption, (CAA2) is 
positive. 
(CBB2): Since (2 + E ao fi I oe) > 0 and BB fi I oe + ao /2 I Be < 0 by assumption, (CBB2) is 
positive. 
(CCC2): Since BB11 1Be+BBhjoe < 0 by assumption, (CCC2) is positive. 
(DD2): Since BB11 1Be < 0, (CDD2) is positive. 
The proof completes. 
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Appendix D: Estimation model for Chapter 3 
Suppose that the home country exports n types of differentiated goods to a foreign 
country. Differentiated goods are produced in the home country and all products are sold in 
the foreign country. Suppose that the same differentiated goods are also produced in the 
foreign country. 
Profits of the home country are as follows. 
(D.l) 
Note that P; is the price in the home country' s currency, q; is sales of good i, C[ ] is 
total cost as a function of total production (= L q; ), pd H is the price of domestic inputs, 
and pm H is the price of imported inputs in the home country's currency. 
Demand for good I is a function of the export price in the foreign country's currency 
relative to the price of competing goods in the foreign country's currency. 
q; = Q;[e;p; ,other factors in country i] for i = l,···,n. (D.2) 
pc; 
Note that pc; denotes the price of competing goods in the foreign country's currency. 
Facing the constraint (2), the home country maximizes (1). A first-order logarithmic 
approximation is performed as follows. 
lnp, ~ ,u, + Pln(MC,)+(l ~ P)ln( :·} si. p, 2 MC,, (D.3) 
where is J.l; the markup for industries, and MC is marginal cost in the home country's 
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currency. 
Adding the logarithm of the exchange rate to both sides, we have 
ln(ep;) = Jl; + Pln(eMC; )+ (1- P)In(pc; ~ sJ. P; ~ MC; (D.4) 
p in (D.4) is interpreted as exchange rate pass-through. 
Now, consider exchange rate pass-through in the case of perfect competition derived in 
reference 1. 
Exchange rate pass-through above is expanded around (0 1,, B fit, B 12 , e), and we have 
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(D.5) 
Then, our estimation equation becomes as follows. 
ln(epJ= f.J; + /31 ln(eMCJ+ f3/J11 ln(eMCJ 
+ j33Bfl 1 ln(eMCJ+ /34 B12 ln(eMCJ+ /34eln(eMC;) 
+ (1- fJ)ln(pc; ~ sJ. P; ~ MC;. 
(D.6) 
For the case of oligopoly, the estimation equation is the same though the signs of the 
coefficients are expected to be opposite. 
An appropriate index for competitors' prices is very difficult to find. For our estimation the 
World CPI is used. 
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Appendix E: General equilibrium model 
Here we construct a general equilibrium model to derive the price function used in our 
empirical tests and to calibrate the effect of domestic competition. 
We basically follow Bergin and Feenstra (2007) and add foreign firms' local 
subsidiaries into the model. The purpose of this model is to check the effect of foreign firms' 
local subsidiaries on exchange rate pass·through that we saw in the partial equilibrium 
model under perfect competition. 
There are three countries, Japan, China and the United States. Each country is 
denoted by x, y, and z, respectively. The U.S. produces a homogenous good z, consumes 
some at home and exports the rest to Japan and China. Japan and China produce 
differentiated goods, whose prices are denoted by Px (in yen) and Py (in yuan), 
respectively. These goods are accepted in a uniform manner across countries and their 
priceintheU.S.are expxand eypy,where ex and ey aretheexchangeratesforJapan 
and China, respectively. 
Share of Three Types of Firms 
We extend the model studied by Bergin and Feenstra (2002). In our model, similarly to 
the model used by Banchetta and Wincoop (2000), each government provides a money 
transfer to its residents at the beginning of a period, and a tax of the same amount is 
collected at the end of the period. Thus, trade should be balanced. In our economy, there is 
no capital accumulation, the market is perfectly competitive, and money supply is equal to 
wage income. 
(E.l) 
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Each country spends a fraction P1 of wage income on its own homogenous good. In the 
U.S., the remaining fraction (1- /31) is spent on the differentiated goods imported from 
Japan and China. However, only in the U.S. is P2 of wage income spent on the products 
from foreign firms' subsidiaries in the U.S. In Japan and China, the remainder (1- P1) of 
income is spent on the homogenous good from the U.S. 
(1- P1)M (1- p1)M In the same way, China's demand for the U.S. good = Y = e y • 
1- y wz eY wz 
The demand for the U.S. good is: 
The market clearing condition for the U.S. good is 
Assume that the wage rate is fixed. With the above market clearing condition, we have 
the following. 
e (t-pJMx +e (t-pJMY + (1-fJ!-pz)Mz +fJzMz =L =Mz. 
X- y- - - Z-
wz wz wz wz wz 
<=>ex (1-~)Mx +ey (1-~)MY =(1-fJJMz. (E.3) 
wz wz wz 
<=>exMx +eYMY =Mz. 
Since we assume that the differentiated goods are exported into the U.S. market, the 
following CES expenditure function is chosen for our analysis of the imported goods 
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market. 
with Y iJ = Y Ji • In the model, the number of firms is endogenous, and N is the maximum 
number of firms including potential entrants to the market. 
Additional restrictions on the parameters of the expenditure function come from its 
homogeneity of degree one: 
Fi Fi 
La; = 1, and LYiJ = 0. (E.5) 
i=i i=i 
Also, all goods are required to enter symmetrically with the r iJ coefficients; that is, 
r .. ~ -r( Nil} and r,, ~ R for i" j' with i,j ~ l,···,N. (E.6) 
Suppose the symmetry restriction (E.6) is imposed on the expenditure function (E.4). In 
addition, suppose that only goods 
1
. = 1 . . . N are available, such that the reservation , , 
prices p 1 for j = N + 1, · · ·, N are used. Then, with proposition 1 in the analysis by 
Bergin and Feenstra (2007), the expenditure function becomes 
Here, C;; = -r( N; 1). and ciJ = ~ for i * j, with i,j = l,···,N. (E.8) 
a; = a; + ~ (1-I:1 aJ for i = 1, · · ·, N. (E.9) 
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By differentiating both sides of Equation (E. 7) with respect to In P;, we have the share 
of i th firm: 
N 
si =a;+ Icifpr 
j=l 
Solving the above equation using Equation (E.8), we have 
Sx =ax- yNY [In(expJ-In(eypJ]- yN. [In(expJ-In{p.)l 
N N 
Sy =ay _rNx [In(eypy)-In(expJ]-rN• [In(eypy)-In(p.)1 
N N 
s. =a.- ~x [In(p.)-In(expJ]- r; [In{p.)-In(eYpJ]. 
(E.lla) 
(E.llb) 
(E.llc) 
The elasticity of demand is derived from Equations (E.lla), (E.llb) and (E.llc) as 
follows. 
1J, = l- aln S, = I _ s_ = I + y(N -I) 'y > O 
8Inp, S, S,N 
Suppose that the exchange rate is set at the beginning of a period, and that the firms set 
their prices after the exchange rate is determined. The firms ignore uncertainties in the 
exchange rate. One unit of output requires one unit of labor in each country. Then, each 
firm optimally chooses its price as 
Note that prices and wages are in dollars. 
Taking logarithms ofboth sides of the above equation, we have 
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Solving Equations (E.12a), (E.12b) and (E.12c), we have 
In eX p X = ( 1 ) + In eX w X + ( 1 ) N y {(a X -a J- r[ln eX w X - In ey w y n 
r N -1 2N -1 r 
+( 1 )Ns{(ax-aJ-y[lnexwx-lnwJ}, 
2N-1 r 
lneYpY = ( 1 )+lneYwY-( 1 ) Nx {(ax-aJ-r[lnexwx-lneYwY]} 
r N -1 2N -1 r 
+ ( 1 ) Ns {(aY -aJ-r[lneYwY -lnwJ1 2N -1 r 
lnps= ( 1 )+lnwz-( 1 )Nx{(ax-a.)-y[lnexwx-lnwJ} 
r N -1 2N -1 r 
-( 1 )NY{(aY-aJ-r[lneYwY-lnwz~ 
2N -1 r 
(E.13a) 
(E.13b) 
(E.13c) 
Using Equations (E.9), (E.lla), (E.llb), (E.llc), (E.l3a), (E.13b) and (E.l3c), we have 
(E.14a) 
(E.14b) 
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(E.14c) 
Free Entey Condition 
With expenditure in the U.S. being equal to Mz (from the cash-in-advance constraint), 
the fraction (1 - f31) is spent on differentiated goods from foreign countries, f32 is spent 
on domestic differentiated goods, and f31 - f32 is on domestic homogenous goods. Then, 
expenditure on Japanese export goods, on Chinese export goods, and on goods from 
Japanese firms' u.s. subsidiaries is sx(l-j]I)Mz' sy(l-jJI)Mz and Ssf3sMz ' 
respectively. With the first order condition, profits for these firms are as follows. 
(E.15a) 
(E.15b) 
(E.l5c) 
Since we assume a zero profit condition, profits in Japan and China are fixed costs, 
e;wJ; fori= x, y, z. From Equations (E.15a), (E.15b) and (E.15c), we have 
(E.16a) 
(E.16b) 
(E.16c) 
r(N -1) 
With '7; = 1 + SN , Equations (E.16a), (E.16b), and (E.16c) become 
I 
(E.17a) 
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(E.17b) 
(E.l7c) 
Market Clearing Condition for the Labor Market 
As for China, one unit of the differentiated goods is produced with one unit of labor. 
Then, the labor demand for Chinese exports to the U.S., which is the sum of labor used in 
production and labor associated with the fixed costs, is expressed as 
We further assume that the differentiated goods are exported only to the U.S. Thus, 
there is no export to Japan. 
China is also assumed to produce a homogenous good which is consumed in the 
domestic market. The labor demand for that sector, which equals the demand for the 
homogenous good divided by labor cost, is as follows. 
f3MY 
Then, the market clearing condition for the labor market in China is 
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( SN ) P; = W; 1 + y(; _1) , we can simplify the above condition as follows. 
(E.18) 
Substituting Equation (E.18) into Equation (E.3), e XM X + eyM y = M z' we have 
(E.19) 
Now, we have seven equations, namely, Equations (E.14a), (E.14b), (E.l4c), (E.17a), 
(E.17b), (E.17c), and (E.19), for seven unknowns ex,Sx,Sy,Ss,Nx,Ny,Ns. Thus, the 
model can be solved. 
Exchange rate pass-through is derived in the following way. First, an import price 
index is constructed with the share-weighted export price denominated in dollars. Note 
that Japan's local subsidiaries do not affect directly the import price index. 
(E.20) 
With Equations E.13(a) and E.13(b), we obtain d In(exPx 1d In(eYpY) 
respectively, as follows. 
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(E.22) 
The exchange rate is a sum weighted by export shares. Then, the log change of the 
exchange rate becomes the following. 
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Table 1: Standard deviation and correlation in Argentina: Actual Data 
Output Consumption Investment 
Output 7.78 0.98 0.90 
Consum_p_tion 0.98 8.59 0.96 
Investment 0.90 0.96 13.65 
Net Exports -0.60 -0.81 -0.81 
Interest Rate Spread -0.88 -0.89 -0.52 
Table 2: Standard deviation and correlation in Argentina 
:Calibration Result (Arellano (2008)) 
Output Consumption Investment 
Output 5.81 0.97 -
Consumption 0.97 6.38 -
Investment - - -
Net Exports -0.25 - -
Interest Rate Spread -0.29 -0.36 -
Table 3: Standard deviation and correlation in Argentina 
:Calibration Result (Shinozaki (2012)) 
Output Consumption Investment 
Output 10.12 0.92 0.67 
Consumption 0.92 11.88 0.59 
Investment 0.67 0.59 26.56 
Net Exports -0.35 -0.35 -0.13 
Interest Rate Spread -0.15 -0.16 -0.21 
Net Exports 
-0.64 
-0.81 
-0.81 
1.75 
0.70 
Net Exports 
-0.25 
-
-
1.50 
0.43 
Net Exports 
-0.35 
-0.35 
-0.13 
10.36 
0.17 
Interest Rate 
Spread 
-0.88 
-0.89 
-0.52 
0.70 
7.78 
Interest Rate 
Spread 
-0.29 
-0.36 
-
0.43 
6.36 
Interest Rate 
Spread 
-0.15 
-0.16 
-0.21 
0.17 
1.18 
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Table 4: Estimation Results without Yen Appreciation Period 
Dependent Variable: Export Price Index (Contractual Currency Basis) 
RE-IV FE-IV 
( 1) ~ (2) 
Adjusted Production Cost 0.247 *** 0.241 
( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 
Adjusted Production Cost 0.185 *** 0.187 *Japan share 
( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 
Adjusted Production Cost 
*Japan share -0.131 *** -0.129 
(Only overseas subsidiaries) 
( 0.027 ) ( 0.027 
Adjusted Production Cost 
-0.211 *** -0.213 
*China share 
( 0.024 ) ( 0.024 
World CPI 0.114 *** 0.115 
( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 
Observations 1,920 1,920 
Notes: Adjusted production cost is Exchange Rate times CGPI. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** siginificant at 1%. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The estimation results above use Japanese bubble collapse dummy 
as instrumental variales. 
*** 
) 
*** 
) 
*** 
) 
*** 
) 
*** 
) 
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Table 5: Estimation Results with Yen Appreciation Period 
Dependent Variable: Export Price Index (Contractual Currency Basis) 
RE-IV FE-IV 
(1) (2) 
Adjusted Production Cost 0.344 *** 0.344 
( 0.039 ) ( 0.039 
Adjusted Production Cost 0.185 *** 0.185 
*Japan share 
( 0.020 ) ( 0.021 
Adjusted Production Cost 
*Japan share -0.193 *** -0.193 
(Only overseas subsidiaries) 
( 0.029 ) ( 0.030 
Adjusted Production Cost 
-0.240 *** -0.240 
*China share 
( 0.026 ) ( 0.026 
World CPI 0.118 *** 0.118 
( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 
Adjusted Production Cost 
-0.007 *** -0.007 
*Yen Appreciation Period 
( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 
Observations 1,920 1,920 
Notes: Adjusted production cost is Exchange Rate times CGPI. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** siginificant at 1%. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
The estimation results above use Japanese bubble collapse dummy 
as instrumental variales. 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
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Table 6: Calibration Result: 1% increase ofU.S. Money Supply 
INX I~NX INY I~NX INS ,~NS I 
4.0 -0.1% 16.2 0.8% 0.8 1.4% 
Exchange Rate Pass Through (Number of Firms: Fixed) 
I o.852l 
Exchange Rate Pass Through (Free Entry) 
I o.8o1 I 
Table 7: Relative Wage of Skilled/Unskilled Workers 
Relative wa e of Skilled/Unskilled Workers 
1990 2005 Period over period change 
U.S 1.69 1.98 1.17 
Japan 1.62 1.48 0.91 
U.K. 3.18 2.58 0.81 
Germany 2.29 2.45 1.07 
France 2.29 1.81 0.79 
Italy 1.14 1.11 0.97 
(Note) The estimate for Germany for 1990 is actually for 1991. 
Table s: Compensation and Working Hours of Skilled Labor 
Compensation Working Hours 
1990 2005 Period over 1990 2005 Period over period change period change 
the U.S. 200.4 477.1 2.38 6,722 7,535 
JAPAN 11.8 14.8 1.25 3,898 4,115 
the U.K. 7.5 24.0 3.19 499 784 
Germany 31.8 52.8 1.66 1,004 905 
France 12.8 22.3 1.74 369 506 
Italy 3.0 5.8 1.96 240 265 
(Note) Compensation is denominated in billion dollars for U.S., trillion yen for Japan, 
billion pounds for UK, billion euros for France and Germany . 
Working hours is in million hours. 
1.12 
1.06 
1.57 
0.90 
1.37 
1.11 
Period over 
period change 
ratio 
2.12 
1.18 
2.03 
1.84 
1.27 
1.77 
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Table 9: Decomposition of the Changes in Employment: Total Industry 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
1980-89 0.56 :9.:.Qg 0.57 
·····-·-----...:..::.-
1990-99 ____ 9.:.~!L -0.02 ··---··~ 
·····2ooo-o·;r ------::-·---· 0.51 -0.04 0.55 
~.982-8_~-
·······-···-.Q,36 0.0=!. -~~ 1990-99 0.4§ .. 0.01 0.45 
·----··-··-·:-----2000-04 0.35 0.01 0.33 
Avera~~:e 0.45 -0.02 0.47 Avera~~:e 0.40 0.02 0.38 
Gennanv 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
1980-89 0.35 ··--·······Q~Q~ 0.31 1980-89 - - -_____ .......... . ..... ,,_,...,,_.,,_, ____ 
199D-99 0.59 0.03 0.56 
_,,,.,,_.,,,_,,, .. ,_ ........ 
2000-04 0.62 -0.03 0.65 
1990-99 
...................... .Q.88 -0.0}_ 0.89 ~--·--.... _, .......... _,,_.._., .... 2000-04 0.14 0.00 0.14 
Average 0.50 0.02 0.48 Average 0.38 -0.01 0.39 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
.. J .. ~~-0-89 0.41 ............ _:9:Qg_ r---·--.... 9A.:L .J.98Q:-_~~ ............................ 9J 9 _q,~ ___ ...... QJ .. ? .... 
.... .t~~-Q:-99 .. r----.. ..9·6~.. , _____ :0.0~ 0.69 ._1990:~.~-.......................... 9.:.~3 0.01._ -··-·-·· .. Q,~.;!. 
2000-04 0.58 0.00 0.58 2000-04 0.55 -0.01 0.56 
Average 0.55 -0.01 0.56 Average 0.32 0.01 0.31 
Tab e lU; uecomposition ot the t.;hanges m Employment: !V anutactunng 
U.S. France 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
198D-89 0.57 0.03 0.54 ~!~ ... 0.22 0.00 _, __ Q,.~.L 
r-J_990:!}~_ 0.34 -0.02 0.36 
----·-· 0.06 0.39 200D-04 0.44 
-1-~90-99 0.21 0.00 0.20 
2000-04 0.43 .. --·o:o1 0.43 
Average 0.43 0.02 0.42 Average 0.27 0.00 0.27 
Gennanv 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
r-1..98D-89 0.42 _____ Q,90 0.42 
199D-~..!. 0.54 0.02 
----m------·- 0.04 200D-04 0.71 0.66 
~~9 .. - - -!-... ·-···-"""' 
__ O.QO f---"""'"'""'"-"'"' 
_J990-99 0 .. !.?-- 0.17 
2000-04 0.09 0.01 0.08 
Average 0.52 0.02 0.51 Average 0.13 0.00 0.13 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
198D-89 0.20 -0.01 0.22 1980-89 0.07 0.00 0.07 
199D-99 ..... _,_ 0.56 -0.02 0.59 
200D-04 0.74 0.02 0.72 
199D-99 0.05 0.00 0.04 
-.:··-·--·--- r-------- ... 0.00 0.06 200D-04 0.06 
Average 0.41 -0.01 0.42 Average 0.06 0.00 0.06 
Note: Numbers are percentage changes between years. Between-effects represents shifts across 
SIC industries, and within-effects represent changes within SIC industries. All calculations have 
been annualized. 
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Table 11: Decomposition of the Changes in the Wage Share of Skilled Labor: Total Industry 
U.S. France 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
.J~~Q::89_ 1.01 0.16 0.86 
"""'"'"'-"'""""'"'--
_, ............ , ___ ,_ _ .......... ~
199Q-99 0.5_L 0.07 0.49 
200Q-04 0.82 0.09 0.73 
J .. ~?2-89 __ 
···-·-... .Q:1§_ __, ___ J>.2_?._ 0.24 ---.... - ........... 
1990-99 
......... __ .Q:.?.? 0.19 0.~~-
2000-04 0.05 0.11 -0.06 
Average 0.79 0.10 0.69 Average 0.47 0.18 0.29 
Germanv 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
,..1~8Q-89 0.60 0.12 0.48 ,_ ............................. _ J980-~_!L - - -...................................... .................................... 
-~~..Q:-~ 0.55 0.07 
--m-.. _ .... ..,_ .. ,_, __ , ,_ ...................... _ 200Q-04 0.77 0.00 0.77 -l~-~_9-99 ..... J~:~-- 0.13 0.16 1-·-----·-- .. -------:-2000-04 0.33 0.14 0.19 
Average 0.63 0.07 0.56 Average 0.30 0.13 0.17 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
... J..~8Q-89 0.72 
-- 0.12 0.60 1980-89. ....... - ... ..9: 12 0.08 0.04 
j_~9Q:.~..!! .. 1.02 ____ 0.19 0.83 ,_ .............. ,_ 
.. -----.. ....:=;.,;:-200Q-04 0.75 0.28 0.47 
1990-99 0.40_ 0.08 0.32 
-:-:-;:_ ..... - t--·--···--""'" 2000-04 0.85 0.11 0.74 
Average 0.71 0.17 0.55 Average 0.41 0.09 0.32 
Table 12: Decomposition of the Changes in the Wage Share of Skilled Labor: 
Manufacturing 
U.S. 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
198Q-89 0.77 0.12 0.65 1982-89 0.46 0.01 _____ o:~-
1990-99 0.77 
.............. ..::.9.:.9~ 0.85 
200Q-04 0.95 0.12 0.83 
1990-99 
....... - ........ .Q,45 0.01 0.45 ~-'"'"""'-
-·--·-··· ·-·--·---~-2000-Q4 0.15 0.03 0.12 
average 0.79 0.03 0.77 average 0.38 0.01 0.36 
Germanv 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
198Q-89 0.44 0.04 
·-·m 199Q-99 0.65 0.07 0.58 1980-89 
- - -
..... ,_ ... ,_ 
--··-···--·· 1990-99 0.31 0.01 0.29 
200Q-04 0.33 0.05 0.28 2000-04 0.35 0.02 0.33 
average 0.48 0.05 0.43 average 0.32 0.01 0.31 
Total Between Within Total Between Within 
198Q-89 0.43 -0.04 0.47 
1990-99 0.91 -0.06 0.97 
1980-89 0.05 0.00 0.05 
---'-'-'--'-'"""'"'" 
.... - ................ -........... 
1990-99 0.04 0.00 0.04 
200Q-04 1.01 0.10 0.91 2000-04 0.04 0.00 0.04 
average 0.68 -0.03 0.70 average 0.04 0.00 0.04 
Note: Numbers are percentage changes between years. Between-effects represents shifts across 
SIC industries, and within-effects represent changes within SIC industries. All calculations have 
been annualized. 
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Table 13: Results for U.S. Manufacturing 
Dependent variable: Log Change in Wage Share of High Skilled Labor, 199Q-2005 
the U.S. 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
l:::..ln(K/Y) 
K: Capital services. volume indices. 1995 = 1 00 
Y:Gross Outout. volume indices. 1995=100 
-0.341 -o.282 
( 0.130 ) ( 0.224 ) 
K: Capital compensation 
Y:Gross Outout at current basic prices 
0.018 
( 0.760 ) 
l:::..ln(Y) 
Y:Gross Outout. volume indices. 1995=1 00 
-0.194 -0.192 
( 0.342 ) ( 0.345 ) 
Y:Gross Outout at current basic prices 
-0.821 
Outsourcing 
Intermediate Inputs 
-0.054 
( 0.341 ) 
( 0.082 ) 
0.698 
( 0.094 ) 
Intermediate Inputs: Energy 
Intermediate Inputs: Material 
Intermediate Inputs: Service 
IT_Capital 
0.097 0.118 
( 0.064 ) ( 0.034 ) 
Constant 
0.025 0.023 
( 0.006 ) ( 0.001 ) 
N 208 208 
-0.036 
( 0.570 ) 
0.145 
( 0.196 ) 
-0.188 
( 0.175 ) 
0.113 
( 0.034 ) 
0.026 
( 0.005 ) 
208 
(Note) P-values are shown in the parentheses. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Regression 4 
-0.013 
( 0.824 ) 
-0.251 
( 0.140 ) 
0.042 
( 0.667 ) 
0.269 
( 0.017 ) 
-0.108 
( 0.475 ) 
0.109 
( 0.046 ) 
0.022 
( 0.004 ) 
208 
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Table 14: Results for Japan Manufacturing 
Dependent variable: Log Change in Wage Share of High Skilled Labor, 199D-2005 
JAPAN 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
llln(K/Y) 
K: Capital services. volume indices. 1995 = 1 00 
Y:Gross Output. volume indices. 1995=1 00 
Q137 Q134 
( 0.150 ) ( 0.190 ) 
K: Capital compensation 
Y:Gross Output at current basic prices 
-0.105 
( 0.004 ) 
llln(Y) 
Y:Gross Output. volume indices. 1995=1 00 
-0.032 -o.020 
( 0.738 ) ( 0.865 ) 
Y:Gross Output at current basic prices 
-0.045 
Outsourcing 
Intermediate Inputs 
-0.119 
( 0.013 ) 
( 0.813 ) 
-0.206 
( 0.193 ) 
Intermediate Inputs: Energy 
Intermediate Inputs: Material 
Intermediate Inputs: Service 
IT_Capital 
0.026 0.139 
( 0.351 ) ( 0.003 ) 
Constant 
0.018 O.D18 
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) 
N 201 201 
-o.070 
( 0.270 ) 
-o.020 
( 0.758 ) 
-o.090 
( 0.070 ) 
0.031 
( 0.265 ) 
0.019 
( 0.000 ) 
201 
(Note) P-values are shown in the parentheses. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Regression 4 
-0.114 
( 0.001 ) 
-0.148 
( 0.404 ) 
-0.111 
( 0.049 ) 
0.015 
( 0.900 ) 
-0.141 
( 0.016 ) 
0.175 
( 0.000 ) 
0.018 
( 0.000 ) 
201 
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Table 15: Results for Japan Manufacturing: Imported Intermediate Inputs 
Dependent variable: Log Change in Wage Share of High Skilled Labor, 199Q-2005 
JAPAN 
Regression 1 Regression 2 
61n(K/Y) 
K: Non-IT Caoital compensation 
Y:Gross Output at current basic prices 
-0.016 -0.012 
( 0.013 ) ( 0.037 ) 
61n(Y) 
Y:Gross Outout at current basic prices 
0.009 
( 0.837 ) 
Outsourcing 
Intermediate Inputs 
-0.047 
( 0.198 ) 
-0.032 
( 0.003 ) 
Intermediate Inputs (Only imports) 
-0.011 
( 0.006 ) 
dProd 
IT_Capital 
0.014 0.018 
( 0.049 ) ( 0.021 ) 
Constant 
0.004 0.005 
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) 
N 201 201 
Regression 3 
-0.013 
( 0.032 ) 
-0.026 
( 0.013 ) 
-0.013 
( 0.003 ) 
-0.194 
( 0.039 ) 
0.018 
( 0.023 ) 
0.005 
( 0.000 ) 
201 
(Note) P-values are shown in the parentheses. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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Figure 1: Argentina's current account and its components 
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Figure 2: Argentina's Time Series: Actual Data 
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Figure 3: Bond Price Schedule (A1 ) 
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Figure 4: Bond Price Schedule ( K 1+1 ) 
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Figure 5: Bond Price Schedule ( Bt+1 ) 
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--e-- Low Productivity Shock 
-+- High Productivity Shock 
Figure 6: Policy Function of Physical Capital: B1 = -17.7 
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Figure 7: Policy Function ofBondholding: K, = 55.7 
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Figure s: Value Function: (A,) B(t) 
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Figure 9: Value Function : ( K 1 ) 
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Figure 10: Value Function: ( B1 ) K(t) 
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Figure u: Value Function: (Kt+1 ) 
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Figure 12: Value Function: ( B,+1) 
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Figure 13: Argentina's Time Series: Simulation Result 
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Figure 14: Pass-through Rate in the 1980s (Rolling Regression with a Five-Year Window) 
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Figure 15: Pass-through Rate in the 1990s (Rolling Regression with a Five-Year Window) 
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Figure 16: Japan's Trade Share and its Overseas Local Sales (Total) 
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Figure 17: Japan's Trade Share and its Overseas Local Sales (Transport Equipment) 
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Figure 18: Japan's Trade Share and its Overseas Local Sales (Electronic Equipment) 
(%) 
30.0 
25.0 
20.0 ---
15.0 
10.0 
5.0 
0.0 
~~-, 
1 
-&- Japan Share I 
Subsidiary"s 
Share 
-B- China Share 
(Year) 
i 
91 
Figure 19: Relative wage; U.S., Manufacturing 
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Figure 20: Relative wage; Japan, Manufacturing 
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Figure 21: Relative wage; U.K., Manufacturing 
3.40 
3.20 
3.00 
2.80 
2.60 
2.40 
2.20 
2.00 
Year 
Figure 22: Relative wage; Germany, Manufacturing 
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Figure 23: Relative wage; France, Manufacturing 
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Figure 24: Relative wage; Italy, Manufacturing 
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Figure 25: Labor Service per Hour Worked, Total Industry 
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Figure 26: Labor Service per Hour Worked, Manufacturing 
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Figure 27: Wage Share of Skilled Labor, Total Industry 
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Figure 28: Wage Share of Skilled Labor, Manufacturing 
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Figure 29: Skilled Worker Intensity and Comparative Advantage; U.S. 
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Figure 30: Skilled Worker Intensity and Comparative Advantage; Japan 
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Figure 31: Skilled Worker Intensity and Subsidies minus Taxes 
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